2012-M-207           State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. William Grigsby, Appellant.

The issue in this case is whether a juvenile court’s certification of the proceedings “for action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations” is limited to the offense listed in the certification order.  Minn. Stat. § 260B.125 (2010).  The State filed a delinquency petition against 15-year-old appellant William Grigsby, alleging that Grigsby committed second-degree intentional murder.  The juvenile court granted the State’s motion to certify the proceeding to adult court. 

Based upon the certification order, Grigsby was charged in district court with second-degree intentional murder; the complaint was later amended to include second-degree felony murder.  After a trial, the jury found Grigsby guilty of second-degree felony murder and second-degree

manslaughter, but not guilty of second-degree intentional murder.  The district court convicted Grigsby of second-degree felony murder and imposed a presumptive 180month sentence.  

On appeal, Grigsby argued that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the amended charge of second-degree felony murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree manslaughter.  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the charge specified in the certification order and other charges arising out of the same behavioral incident.  The court also held that the certification process did not violate Grigsby’s right to procedural due process.  Affirmed.

With regard to Grigsby’s due-process right to a hearing, Grigsby does not claim that the juvenile court conducted the adult certification hearing in a manner that violated his right to due process.  Instead, Grigsby claims that due process required the district court to hold a second adult certification proceeding because the jury only found him guilty of the less serious charges, none of which were listed in the juvenile court’s certification order.  At the time of the jury verdicts, however, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction, much less exclusive jurisdiction, over Grigsby for the conduct arising out of the August 23, 2008, behavioral incident.  See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 7 (“When the juvenile court enters an order certifying an alleged violation, the prosecuting authority shall proceed with the case as if the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never attached.”).  In the absence of a statutory right to “exclusive” juvenile court jurisdiction,

Grigsby no longer had a liberty interest in a juvenile adjudication for any offenses arising out of the August 23, 2008, behavioral incident.  Consequently, due process did not require the district court to provide Grigsby with another hearing on the certification issue.  

In sum, Minn. Stat. § 260B.125 unambiguously permits the certification of a “proceeding,” and that “proceeding” includes non-enumerated offenses arising out of the same behavioral incident as the offense enumerated in the certification order.  When the State does not rely on less serious offenses as a ground supporting a motion to certify the proceeding to adult court, and when notice of less serious crimes will not help the child mount a defense to the State’s motion, due process does not require the State to notify the child of all the less serious offenses he might face.  Following a valid certification order, a child no longer has a recognized liberty interest in a juvenile adjudication for offenses arising out of the behavioral incident that was certified to adult court, and therefore due process does not require a district court to provide the child another hearing on the certification issue.

Affirmed.

Meyer (Gildea, Page, Paul Anderson, Barry Anderson, Dietzen and Stras)

[MURDER]