Do not respond to divorce papers with a twelve-gauge shotgun.


2014-M-265       Robert Michael Hughes, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

THE CRIME:  Tammy Hughes told her husband that she would be serving him with divorce papers after nine years of marriage.  Witnesses described him as "sad, helpless, hysterical, and must importantly, determined" in the next two days.  Mike cried at the bank when they severed their accounts.  Mike cried after he bought a shotgun.  Mike cried in front of his five-year-old daughter and three-year-old son.

On the morning of May 23, 2006, Tammy met with her lawyer, then returned to her Albert Lea home for lunch.  Mike shot her in the back with the shotgun.  Then Mike nudged her over, stared into her eyes, and shot her in the chest.

After he was sentenced to life in prison, he protested when the judge ordered him to pay Tammy's family for her funeral.  "That funeral did not cost Tammy a cent."

FIRSTAPPEAL:  This is an appeal from the post-conviction court’s denial of appellant Robert Michael Hughes’ second petition for post-conviction relief.  After a jury trial in October 2006, Hughes was found guilty, subsequently convicted, and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for the murder of his wife, Tammy, under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2012) (first-degree premeditated murder).1

With the assistance of court-appointed counsel, Hughes filed a direct appeal, raising two claims: (1) insufficient evidence to support his premeditated murder conviction; and (2) errors in failing to provide two jury instructions.  State v. Hughes (Hughes I), 749 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. 2008).  Hughes also filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several additional claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel/access to the courts.  We affirmed and denied all of Hughes’ pro se claims, holding that they were “without merit.”  Id. at 318.  The United States Supreme Court denied Hughes’ petition for a writ of certiorari in November 2008.  Hughes v. Minnesota, 555 U.S. 1036 (2008).

Hughes filed his first petition for post-conviction relief in November 2010, raising 18 separate grounds for relief.  The post-conviction court denied relief without a hearing.  Hughes appealed, and we affirmed.  Hughes v. State (Hughes II), 815 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2012).  Hughes again appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which again denied certiorari.  Hughes v. Minnesota, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 856 (2013).

THIS APPEAL:  Hughes filed the petition for post-conviction relief at issue in this appeal in March 2013.  In this, his second petition, Hughes alleged several claims for relief,2 primarily focused on ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Hughes requested an evidentiary hearing as well as court-appointed counsel to assist with his petition.  In September 2013, the post-conviction court denied the petition without appointing counsel and without holding an evidentiary hearing.  The post-conviction court held that Hughes’ petition is procedurally barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subds. 1 and 4(a)(2) (2012), Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2012), and State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).

We review the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion.  Erickson v. State, 842 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2014).

Hughes first argues that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his request for court-appointed counsel to assist him with his petition for post-conviction relief.  He argues that, “to present a claim of ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel in accordance with the State’s procedures,” he needed the help of an attorney.  The post-conviction court, citing Barnes v. State, 768 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 2009), denied his request.  In Barnes, we held that a defendant who has been represented by counsel on direct appeal has no right under the Minnesota Constitution to the assistance of appointed counsel in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding.  Hughes was represented by appointed counsel on direct appeal.  Hughes I, 749 N.W.2d at 309.  Hughes’ second petition for post-conviction relief is a subsequent post-conviction proceeding.  As a result, Hughes has no right to appointed counsel in this appeal.  Therefore, the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hughes’ request for appointed counsel to assist him with the instant petition for post-conviction relief.

We turn next to the post-conviction court’s denial of Hughes’ petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.  The post-conviction court held that Hughes’ petition for post-conviction relief is procedurally barred for three reasons: (1) Hughes’ direct appeal has been completed and the asserted grounds for relief were raised in his direct appeal, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (barring a petition for post-conviction relief that follows completion of a direct appeal if the post-conviction petition is based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence); (2) it is a successive petition in which the issues raised were addressed on direct appeal and in his first petition for post-conviction relief, Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (permitting the post-conviction court to summarily deny a second or successive petition seeking similar relief if an appellate court has decided the issues in the same case); and (3) it is barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (requiring a post-conviction petition to be filed within 2 years of an appellate court’s final disposition of the direct appeal), because it was filed more than 2 years after Hughes’ direct appeal became final and Hughes failed to satisfy any of the exceptions to the 2-year statute of limitations set out in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (1) -(5) (2012) (permitting a court to hear an otherwise time-barred petition if petitioner satisfies an enumerated exception).

On appeal, Hughes argues that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.  We disagree.  When a petitioner alleges facts that, even if true, are legally insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief, the post-conviction court need not hold an evidentiary hearing.  Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012); Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn. 2013).  Like the post-conviction court, we conclude that Hughes’ claims in the instant petition for post-conviction relief are time-barred.  See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2); see also id., subd. 4(b)(5) (providing that a court may consider a time-barred petition in the interests of justice only if the petition is not frivolous); Berkovitz v. State, 826 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim was frivolous because it had been previously presented and rejected on direct appeal).  Therefore, we hold that the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Hughes’ petition for post-conviction relief.

Affirmed.

1. Appellant did not have a right to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings when he was represented by counsel on direct appeal.

2. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s second petition for post-conviction relief because appellant’s claims are time-barred.

Affirmed.

Page (Gildea, Anderson, Dietzen, Stras, Wright, and Lillehaug)

[MURDER]

A13-2169,