People will talk!

2014-M-272       State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Mahdi Hassan Ali, Appellant.

THE CRUNE:  Minneapolis is the largest second-largest Somali city in the world, second only to Mogadishu.  Over 50,000 refugees were brought to the city by charity organizations.  Their civil war has followed them.

On January 6, 2010, Ali entered the Seward Market to rob its Somali owners.  He confronted the unarmed Osman Elmi and Mohammed Warfa behind the counter.  When customer Anwar Mohammed  entered the store, Ali murdered him with shots to the face and body.  Ali fled the store, but returned shortly thereafter.  Warfa had been trying to lock the door, but Ali shot him at least twice.  Warfa's falling body blocked open the store's door.  Then Ali hunted Elmi through the store.  As the security camer rolled, Ali fatally shot Elmi three times in the back.  Ali and his accomplice fled the store in less than two minutes after the robbery began.

The word was that the robbers had targeted the market because it was also a money-transmitting facility that was approved under Somali beliefs.

Within two days and with two tips, police had tracked down Ali and his accomplice.  The accomplice agreed to testify against Ali in return for an 18-year sentence.

MAJORITY:  Appellant Mahdi Hassan Ali was convicted of one count of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of first-degree felony murder for shooting and killing three men during a robbery of the Seward Market in Minneapolis on January 6, 2010.  We consolidated Mahdi’s direct appeal and his post-conviction appeal. 

On appeal, Mahdi raises a series of arguments. 

First, he challenges the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. 

Second, Mahdi argues that the district court erred by allowing opinion testimony relating to surveillance videos that tended to identify him as the gunman.

Third, Mahdi argues that the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of release (LWOR) violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment under Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

 Fourth, he argues that the district court’s discretionary imposition of consecutive sentences violated the rule announced in Miller and Article I, Section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution, and that the district court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. 

Fifth, Mahdi raises a number of other claims in a pro se supplemental brief. 

Because we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err, the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in imposing consecutive sentences, and Mahdi’s pro se arguments lack merit, we affirm on these issues. 

But because we hold that the mandatory LWOR sentence on the first-degree premeditated murder conviction is unconstitutional under Miller, we vacate that sentence and remand for resentencing on the first-degree premeditated murder conviction following a Miller hearing

HELD:  1. Because the foundation requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 901 and 902 were not satisfied, the court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit a birth certificate into evidence at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing.

2. Because opinion testimony relating to surveillance videos was helpful to the jury, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.

3. Although the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of release for a juvenile convicted of first-degree premeditated murder violates the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), the district court has the inherent judicial authority to hold a Miller hearing on remand.

4. The discretionary imposition of consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of release does not violate the Miller rule or Minn. Const. art. I, § 5, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences in a case in which multiple victims were murdered. 

5. Appellant’s pro se arguments are without merit.

 Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

CONCUR & DISSENT:  Justice Page opined: “The court remands Mahdi’s case for a hearing to comply with the requirements of Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), for the judge or a jury to consider whether a life sentence with the possibility of release after 30 years is a more appropriate sentence than the mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release (LWOR), which he is now serving.  The case law on which the court relies to justify its

decision is inapposite.  In my view, the appropriate remedy is to sever the heinous-crimes statute as it relates to juveniles and revive the most recent constitutionally valid versions of Minn. Stat. §§ 244.05, subd. 4(b), 609.106, subd. 2(1), and 609.185 (2012) for juvenile offenders only, and then remand to the district court for imposition of a life sentence with the possibility of release after 30 years.  The previous versions of these statutes did not provide for a departure mechanism for the district court to consider whether, despite the defendant’s youth, an LWOR sentence was more appropriate.  See Minn. Stat. §§ 244.05, subd. 4, 609.106, subd. 2(1), and 609.185 (2004).  Reviving these statutes is the appropriate remedy because, as an issue of substantive law, fixing the sentence to be imposed for first-degree premeditated murder is a legislative function.  Under the separation of powers, see Minn. Const. art. III, § 1, our court lacks the authority to remand Mahdi’s case for a hearing to consider whether a life sentence with the possibility of release after 30 years is more appropriate than an LWOR sentence.  The court’s decision to modify the unconstitutional sentencing scheme now in place and replace it with a judicially created scheme usurps the Legislature’s authority to amend its own statutes.  For that reason, I respectfully dissent from part III of the court’s decision.

CONCUR & DISSENT:  Justice Stras opined: “I agree with many of the points made in Justice Page’s dissent, but write separately to explain my disagreement with Part III of the court’s opinion.  The Legislature has stated in clear and unambiguous terms: “The court shall sentence a

person to life imprisonment without possibility of release” for a conviction of first-degree

premeditated murder.  Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2 (2012).  The entire court agrees that

the mandatory LWOR sentence prescribed by the Legislature is unconstitutional with respect to juveniles like Mahdi Ali under Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012),1 but we disagree about the proper remedy.

Gildea (Anderson, Dietzen, Wright, and Lillehaug)

            Concur & Dissent:  Page

            Concur & Dissent:  Stras

[GILDEA] [MURDER]

A12-173, A13-996,