If there are witnesses, and your only defense is "self-defense," you had better be believable!

2015-M-293       Chaun Dubae Carridine, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Following a jury trial, Carridine was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of Lorenzo Guffie.  It is undisputed that on the night of June 3, 2007, Carridine shot Guffie while Guffie was in a car outside of a bar in Minneapolis.  Guffie died as a result of the shooting, and the State charged Carridine with first-degree premeditated murder.  Carridine argued at trial that he acted in self-defense.  Specifically, Carridine claimed that Guffie’s car swerved and hit Carridine, and that Guffie pulled out a gun and threatened Carridine, so Carridine had no choice but to use his gun.  The jury found Carridine guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, and the district court convicted Carridine and sentenced him to life in prison.  We affirmed the conviction.  State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 151 (Minn. 2012).  Carridine then pursued post-conviction relief.

This case comes to us on appeal from the denial of Chaun Dubae Carridine’s petition for post-conviction relief.  Carridine filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging a number of claims.  The post-conviction court summarily denied relief on all claims but the claim of newly discovered evidence based on two affidavits.  The court granted an evidentiary hearing on the newly discovered evidence claim based on these affidavits.  After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief on that claim as well.  Carridine appeals.  Because the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Carridine’s request for post-conviction relief, we affirm.

Our opinion in State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 2012), contains a detailed factual description of the murder and the evidence presented at trial

HELD:  1. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied appellant’s claims that the district court erred in admitting impeachment evidence, the prosecutor committed misconduct, appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective, and an affidavit represented newly discovered evidence, because those claims were procedurally barred.  

2. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim because the facts alleged in the petition, even if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, fail to satisfy the Strickland test.

3. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion when, following an evidentiary hearing, it denied appellant’s newly discovered evidence claim because the record supports the court’s finding that the testimony of the newly discovered witnesses was doubtful. 

 Affirmed.

Gildea (Page, Anderson, Dietzen, Stras, Wright, and Lillehaug)

[MURDER]

A14-1198,