If 15 is old enough to shoot four people and steal three cars, is 15 too young to be sentenced to life with the possibility of release after 30 years?

2014-M-266       Kim Thul Ouk, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

In 1992, a jury found then-15-year-old appellant Kim Thul Ouk guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder.  Each count involved a separate victim.  The district court imposed two mandatory life sentences with the possibility of release and two 15-year sentences.  In June 2013 Ouk filed a post-conviction motion to correct his sentence, citing Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012), in which the United States Supreme Court held that, as applied to juveniles, sentencing schemes mandating life without the possibility of release violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.  The post-conviction court denied Ouk’s motion, concluding that Ouk’s sentence was lawful because Miller is not retroactive.  On appeal Ouk asks “that his sentence be vacated and remand[ed] for individualize[d] re-sentencing in accordance with the process articulated in Miller.”  Because we conclude that a statutory scheme mandating a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release is materially different from a statutory scheme mandating a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release, we affirm. 

A mandatory sentence of life with the possibility of release for a juvenile is not unconstitutional under the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to correct his sentence.

Affirmed.

Barry Anderson (Gildea, Page, Dietzen, Stras, Wright, and Lillehaug)

[MURDER]

A13-1959,