Butchering an unarmed and innocent man in a gang war is not good behavior!

2015-M-289       LaMonte Rydell Martin, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

THE CRIME:  Martin was a member of the Tre Tre Crips, a Minneapolis gang who was "at war" with the 19 Block Dipsets.  On May 3, 2006, Martin was driving with other Tre Tre Crips when they saw rival Jermaine Mack-Lynch walking with his innocent cousin Christopher Lynch walking down the street.  The Crips dismounted and chased the two men.  When Lynch stopped because he was out of breath, Martin shot him 11 to 13 times.

At the time of his crime, Martin was six weeks short of his eighteenth birthday.

MAJORITY:  Appellant LaMonte Rydell Martin was found guilty of first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang and first-degree premeditated murder.  The district court entered judgment of conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, and imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of release (LWOR).  The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.  State v. Martin (Martin I), 773 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2009). 

In August 2011, Martin filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, recantations by two witnesses.  On appeal, we reversed in part, concluding that Martin was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his witness recantation claim, but affirmed the denial of his other claims.  Martin v. State (Martin II), 825 N.W.2d 734 (Minn. 2013). 

We remanded the case to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing on the witness recantation claim.  Id. at 743.  Subsequently, Martin filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his life sentence is unconstitutional under the Federal and State Constitutions, and claiming he is entitled to the retroactive application of Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 

On remand, the post-conviction court consolidated both matters, conducted an evidentiary hearing, and then denied Martin’s witness recantation claim from his first post-conviction petition, and denied his second post-conviction petition.  We affirm. 

HELD:  1.  The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion by concluding, without requiring the witness to testify, that the witness validly invoked the privilege against self-incrimination through his attorney at an evidentiary hearing.  Moreover, the court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion, brought under Minn. Stat. § 609.09, subd. 1 (2014), to grant a witness immunity to testify to overcome a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination.

2. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s first petition for post-conviction relief on the ground that the witness recantation claim lacked merit.

3. Because Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) does not apply retroactively, appellant’s second petition for post-conviction relief is time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2014), and therefore the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying the second petition.

 Affirmed.

CONCUR:  Justice Anderson opined: “The majority correctly concludes that Martin is not entitled to retroactive application of Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), under Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013), and Roman Nose v. State, 845 N.W.2d 193, 200 (Minn. 2014). 

But I write separately, as I did in Chambers and Roman Nose, to reiterate the need for resolution of this issue by the United States Supreme Court, and failing action in that forum, additional attention from our court

CONCUR:  Justice Lillehaug opined: “On whether Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), should be applied retroactively, I concur based on the doctrine of stare decisis, as I did in Roman Nose v. State, 845 N.W.2d 193, 204 (Minn. 2014) (Lillehaug, J., concurring).  

 Four other state high courts have held that Miller is not retroactive, while ten disagree.  See Martin v. Symmes, 782 F.3d 939, 945 (8th Cir. 2015).  I share Justice G. Barry Anderson’s hope that the issue will soon be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.  Whether Miller is retroactive should not vary from state to state and from juvenile to juvenile.

DISSENT:  Justice Page opined: “I respectfully dissent.  I do so for the reasons set forth in section I of my dissent in Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 342-44 (Minn. 2013) (Page, J., dissenting), and my dissent in Roman Nose v. State, 845 N.W.2d 193, 204-05 (Minn. 2014) (Page, J., dissenting).

Dietzen (Gildea, Stras, and Wright)

Concur:  Anderson

Concur:  Lillehaug

Dissent:  Page

[MURDER]

A14-84,