2012-M-206           James Luther Carlton, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

MAJORITY:  Appellant James Luther Carlton was convicted of first-degree premeditated

murder and first-degree murder while committing criminal sexual conduct in connection

with the death of Jodi Dover.  Carlton filed a notice of direct appeal, which we stayed on

May 13, 1996, pending post-conviction proceedings in the district court.  Carlton neither

filed a petition for post-conviction relief nor followed through with his direct appeal, and

we dismissed his appeal on June 12, 1997.  

In this case, Carlton appeals the denial of his first petition for post-conviction relief, which was filed in Hennepin County District Court on August 10, 2010.  Because we conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied Carlton’s petition, we affirm.

HELD:  First, appellant’s post-conviction claims are barred by the 2-year time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2010), because they do not satisfy the interests-of-justice exception in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2010).

Second, application of the time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), does not violate appellant’s due process rights under the Minnesota Constitution.

CONCUR:  Justice Paul Anderson opined: “I concur in the judgment of the court, but I write separately to express my concern that the court writes too broadly in the course of deciding whether the State waived the time limits of Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2010).   I agree with the court that, in assessing the timeliness of Carlton’s petition for post-conviction relief in this case, we may consider Carlton’s invocation of the interests of justice exception without first deciding whether the claimed exception meets the 2-year time limit of subdivision 4(c). 

The court correctly notes that the State does not argue, and has not argued, that Carlton’s petition is barred by subdivision 4(c)’s time limit.  The court also persuasively explains that neither the express language nor the legislative history of subdivision 4(c) shows the time limit to be a jurisdictional prerequisite incapable of waiver.  But in my view, that is all that is necessary to decide the issue in this case.

CONCUR:  Justice Stras opined: “I join the court’s opinion, except its analysis of the doctrine of equitable tolling.  I agree with the court’s conclusion that the time restriction in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2010), is not a jurisdictional limitation.  But I disagree with the court’s reliance on equitable tolling in reaching that conclusion.  I further disagree with the suggestion in the court’s opinion that equitable tolling would apply in appropriate factual circumstances to revive an otherwise untimely petition for post-conviction relief.  I therefore write separately to express my view that the doctrine of equitable tolling is unavailable under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c).

DISSENT:  Justice Page opined: “I respectfully dissent.  The court’s conclusion that persons convicted of a crime under state law in Minnesota do not have a constitutional right to at least one substantive review of their conviction is flawed.  In this case, in which appellant has had no

substantive review of his conviction, I find the court’s almost casual disregard for its responsibility to ensure due process troubling!  Our “unique” tradition of the right to one review, first articulated in State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 251-52, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976), and subsequently applied in at least 13 instances, see infra, is a right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.  Thus, to the extent that Minn. Stat. ch. 590 (2010) precludes a defendant’s right to our substantive review of his or her conviction, it is unconstitutional.

Gildea (Meyer, Barry Anderson, and Dietzen)

               Concur:  Paul Anderson

               Concur:  Stras

               Dissent:  Page

MURDER] [SEPARATION OFPOWERS]