2013-M-233 Michael Carrasco Sontoya, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
MAJORITY: Appellant Michael Carrasco Sontoya was convicted on May 14, 2009, of first-degree murder while committing first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat § 609.185(a)(2)(2012). He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.
On direct appeal to our court, he challenged his conviction on several grounds but did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 872, 874-76 (Minn. 2010). We affirmed his conviction on September 16, 2010.
On September 16, 2011, Sontoya filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. According to Sontoya, his privately-retained attorney concealed a purported conflict of interest stemming from counsel’s representation of a cousin of Sontoya’s victim in an unrelated federal narcotics case. The post-conviction court denied Sontoya’s petition without a hearing. Sontoya now argues that the district court abused its discretion in summarily denying his petition. Because his claim is barred by the Knaffla rule, we affirm.
HELD: Because appellant knew or should have known about a purported conflict of interest and other alleged deficiencies comprising his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim at the time of his direct appeal, that claim is barred by application of State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).
CONCUR: Justice Page opined: “I agree with the court that Sontoya’s claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, which he alleges resulted from his counsel’s conflict of interest, is
procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla. 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976) (providing that all matters raised on direct appeal, and all claims that were known or should have been known but not raised on direct appeal, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief). According to Sontoya, his counsel was ineffective by failing to take a number of actions that affected the outcome of his trial, including preparing him to testify, hiring an investigator, investigating the facts of the case, sharing discovery, filing pretrial motions, retaining a medical expert, calling favorable witnesses, and objecting to the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the victim’s cause of death. Each of these alleged failures took place before or during trial and were either known, or should have been known, by Sontoya and therefore could have been raised, but were not, at the time of Sontoya’s direct appeal. Thus, Sontoya’s ineffective-assistance-of-coun
Because Sontoya’s ineffective-assistance-of-coun
CONCUR: JusticePaul Anderson opined: “I concur in the judgment of the majority, but write separately because I come to the same result on narrower grounds.
Under Minnesota law, defendants are entitled to petition for post-conviction relief by claiming that “the conviction obtained or the sentence or other disposition” made violated the defendant’s rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or Minnesota, or if new scientific evidence emerges. Minn. Stat. § 590.01 subd. 1 (2012). The post-conviction court must hold a hearing on such a petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04 (2012). But we have said that “[a] post-conviction court . . . need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief.” Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012).
Sontoya’s conflict-of-interest claim does not meet our statutory threshold for a hearing because, even if the claim was proven to be true, it would not entitle Sontoya to post-conviction relief. Such an analysis is sufficient to resolve the present case. As the majority notes, there is no merit to Sontoya’s claim that an indirect potential conflict based on a loose familial relation with the victim would be sufficient for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both the United States Supreme Court and our court have held that the mere potential of a conflict is not sufficient to render counsel’s performance constitutionally deficient. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (“[T]he possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.”); accord Cuypers v. State, 711 N.W.2d 100, 104 (Minn. 2006) (“A Sixth Amendment violation can be demonstrated by showing that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance.” (emphasis added)).
Sontoya’s failure to meet the statutory threshold for a hearing should be the end of our court’s inquiry for two reasons. First, we have held that “we need not decide whether . . . claims are Knaffla barred [when] they fail on their merits.” Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010). Second, if Sontoya’s claim carried sufficient merit to survive our threshold analysis—and thus reach the Knaffla inquiry—I believe that on similar facts a defendant may well be entitled to a hearing on his or her petition for post-conviction relief. Sontoya claims that his trial counsel lied to him and that he was deceived by his attorney’s lies. By holding that Sontoya’s claim is Knaffla-barred, the majority risks creating a high standard—too high for defendants seeking post-conviction relief. I find it troubling to contemplate that we may be imposing a burden on criminal defendants to independently investigate and verify claims made to them by their trial counsel. I am particularly concerned because the seriousness of the charges against Sontoya most likely mean that he was incarcerated when he was allegedly lied to and thus had limited resources available to conduct any independent investigation of his trial counsel’s alleged lies.
Nevertheless, the majority correctly concludes that the other bases for Sontoya’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim are barred under Knaffla. The relevant events occurred at trial, which means that Sontoya was certainly aware of them. Once these alleged errors are stripped out of Sontoya’s current petition, the petition fails on its merits. Where I part ways with my colleagues, however, is in looking at the core claim underlying the current petition: Sontoya’s alleged deception at the hands of his trial counsel. If the consequences of that deception had been potentially prejudicial and survived our threshold analysis, I believe that a similarly situated defendant may well be entitled to a hearing so that the court is in a position to understand more about the alleged deception, relevant time lines, and other matters.
An additional reason that I concur in the judgment is that, even though I would not reach the Knaffla analysis, and I am concerned that the majority is imposing a burden on criminal defendants, it is worth noting how narrow and fact-based the majority’s Knaffla analysis is. Indeed, Sontoya—unlike similarly situated criminal defendants—specifically asked his trial counsel, in the presence of several family members, about the alleged conflict of interest.
Barry Anderson (Gildea, Dietzen, Stras, and Wright)
Concur: Page
Concur: Paul Anderson
[MURDER]
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