2012-M-202       State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Nicole Marie Beecroft, Appellant (A09-0390), and Nicole Marie Beecroft, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent (A10-1604).

MAJORITY:  Nicole Marie Beecroft was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2010), for the stabbing death of her newborn baby.  The Washington County District Court convicted Beecroft of this offense and sentenced Beecroft, who was 17 years old and 9 months of age at the time of her baby’s death, to life imprisonment without the possibility of release.  Beecroft filed a direct appeal, but that appeal was stayed in order for Beecroft to file a petition for post-conviction relief.  After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Beecroft’s petition. 

Beecroft alleges in her consolidated direct and post-conviction appeal that (1) the State deprived her of her due process right to present a complete defense, (2) she was denied effective assistance of counsel, and (3) the district court erred when it violated her rights under Miranda v. Arizona by admitting a statement she made to the police.  In the alternative, Beecroft argues that we should reverse her conviction in the interests of justice.

 The key factual issue at trial was whether Beecroft’s baby was alive or dead when stabbed by Beecroft.  Each party presented testimony on this issue from medical examiners and other forensic pathologists; but, certain state officials interfered with Beecroft’s forensic experts, which interference undermined the integrity of the judicial system in this case.  While the trial errors alleged by Beecroft may not in and of themselves warrant a reversal and the grant of a new trial, we conclude that, when the existence of the alleged errors is combined with the improper conduct of certain state officials, a reversal is warranted in the interests of justice.  Therefore, we reverse Beecroft’s conviction and remand for a new trial.t

HELD:  First, the conduct of a private government contractor was state action for purposes of an alleged constitutional violation when that contractor served part-time as a county official

and nearly all of the alleged misconduct occurred in the contractor’s capacity as a county

official.

Second, the harmful conduct of certain third-party state actors did not in and of itself warrant a new trial because even though the state actors’ conduct violated the defendant’s due process right to present a complete defense by substantially interfering with the defendant’s potential witnesses, the interference did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights given the strength of the State’s case and the defendant’s failure to mitigate the harm caused by her witnesses’ unavailability.

Third, a third-party state actor’s interference with the defendant’s consulting expert does

not warrant a new trial under this court’s plain error standard of review because the

defendant did not present evidence of specific harm that she suffered as a result of her

consulting expert’s decision to stop consulting with her during her trial.

Fourth, this court will exercise its supervisory powers and reverse a defendant’s conviction in the interests of justice when the conduct of certain third-party state actors risked undermining the defendant’s constitutional rights, contravened clear legislative intent, and interfered with the statutorily-mandated independence of medical examiners.

 Fifth, the district court did not err when it admitted the out-of-court statement made by a defendant who was 17 years and 9 months of age at the time of the statement was made because the defendant received an adequate Miranda warning given the defendant’s age, the defendant’s mother was present when the Miranda warning was given, the police informed the defendant about the serious nature of the potential adult-court charges the defendant faced, and because under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant waived her Miranda rights.   Reversed and remanded.

CONCUR:  Justice Barry Anderson opined: “I concur in the result reached by the plurality but arrive at that outcome by a different route.  The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.  This right, of course, is not a guarantee of perfect, error-free representation.  It has been aptly said that “the [right to counsel] guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney.  It does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim.” 

But when defense counsel fails to identify and object to obvious prosecutorial misconduct or other obvious prejudicial error, and there is no objectively reasonable strategy or tactic explaining counsel’s failure to intervene, the fairness of a defendant’s trial is cast into doubt.  I would conclude that Beecroft did not have effective assistance of trial counsel and would reverse and remand for a new trial on that basis.

DISSENT:    Justices Gildea and Dietzen opined: “The plurality reverses the guilty verdict in this case, not because it concludes that there was prejudicial error in the trial, but because the plurality concludes that reversal is in the “interests of justice.”  In my view, this is not a case where we should resort to our supervisory powers over the administration of justice to reverse.  I also disagree with the concurrence that the performance of Beecroft’s counsel requires a new trial.  I therefore dissent.  I would affirm the verdict and the decision of the post-conviction court to deny Beecroft’s petition for post-conviction relief.

Paul Anderson (Page, Meyer)

Concur:  Barry Anderson

Dissent:  Gildea and Dietzen

Dissent:  Stras

[MURDER} [DOMESTIC]