2011-M-187             State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Lincoln Lamar Caldwell, Appellant, and Lincoln Lamar Caldwell, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent, and Lincoln Lamar Caldwell, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Lincoln Caldwell was convicted in Hennepin County District Court of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang.  The court sentenced Caldwell to life in prison without any possibility of release.  Caldwell has appealed his conviction and the denial of two post-conviction petitions and raises five issues in his principal brief.  He also raises several arguments in a separate pro se brief. 

On appeal, Caldwell argues that (1) Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 4 (2010), bars his conviction; (2) there was insufficient evidence of the principal’s intent and premeditation to support Caldwell’s conviction; (3) there was insufficient evidence that the group of which he was a member met the definition of a gang under Minn. Stat. § 609.229 (2010); (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (5) newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial.  We affirm.

HELD:  First, Minnesota Statutes § 609.05, subd. 4 (2010), permits the conviction of a defendant for aiding and abetting first-degree murder notwithstanding the fact that the party who fired the shots that killed the victim was acquitted of first-degree murder and convicted of second-degree murder, the latter of which is a lesser degree of the crime of first-degree murder.  

Second, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the party who fired the shots that killed the victim had the necessary intent and premeditation to sustain the defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree murder.  

Third, there was sufficient evidence that the group of persons with whom the defendant associated, and for whose benefit he committed the crime of first-degree murder, was a gang as defined by Minn. Stat. § 609.229 (2010).  

Fourth, the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel by his counsel’s performance during voir dire or due to the fact that his relationship with his counsel was limited to three pretrial conversations because defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was unreasonable, or that he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel’s performance.  

Fifth, the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the basis of newly discovered evidence because the record indicates that the defendant was aware of the substance of the newly discovered evidence at the time of trial.

Paul Anderson (Gildea, Page, Meyer, Barry Anderson, Dietzen and Stras)

[MURDER]