2011-M-181            State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Dameon Deshay Gatson, Appellant.

The father of a yet-unborn child had a man punch the mother’s stomach repeatedly.  A caesarean delivery was followed by several operations, but the child died.  The father appealed with a claim that the infant “was not a human being.”  His conviction was affirmed.

On July 5, 2007, appellant Dameon Deshay Gatson was indicted for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and first-degree assault, pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1), 609.19, subd. 1(1), and 609.221, subd. 1 (2010), respectively.  On October 30, 2009, a jury found Gatson guilty on all three counts.  The trial court denied Gatson’s motion for a new trial, convicted him of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree assault, and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release for the murder conviction and to a concurrent 86-month term for the first-degree assault conviction. 

In this direct appeal, Gatson raises the following issues:  (1) whether the trial court erred when it found that the State’s asserted reason for striking a prospective juror was not a pretext for purposeful discrimination; (2) whether the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gatson knowingly and intentionally aided another in committing the assault and the intentional killing of a human being; (3) whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury sua sponte on whether the homicide victim was a “human being” and whether the removal of the victim’s life support was a superseding intervening cause for purposes of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1) and 609.19, subd. 1(1); (4) whether the trial court erred when it denied Gatson’s request to instruct the jury on attempted murder and first-degree assault as lesser-included offenses of the first-degree murder charge; (5) whether the trial court’s decision to admit portions of Gatson’s accomplice’s guilty plea violated Gatson’s right to confrontation and our hearsay rules; (6) whether Gatson was denied a fair trial due to the State’s opening statements regarding his accomplice’s testimony; and (7) whether the trial court erred when it denied Gatson’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Gatson’s convictions.

First, the trial court did not err when it failed to instruct the jury sua sponte as to what constitutes a “human being” for purposes of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1) and 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2010).

Second, the trial court did not err when it declined to instruct the jury that removal of the victim’s life support could be a superseding intervening cause of her death.

Third, the trial court did not err when it concluded that the State’s asserted reason for striking an African-American male prospective juror was not a pretext for purposeful discrimination

Fourth, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly and intentionally aided the crimes of another.

Fifth, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s request to instruct the jury on attempted murder and first-degree assault as lesser-included offenses of the first-degree murder charge.

Sixth, even if the trial court erred when it admitted out-of-court statements in violation of appellant’s right to confrontation and our hearsay rules, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury’s verdict was surely not attributable to the error.       

Seventh, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny appellant’s motion for a new trial based on the State’s opening statements with respect to appellant’s accomplice’s testimony. 

Eighth, even if the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, any error was harmless. 

Page (Gildea, Paul Anderson, Meyer, Barry Anderson, Dietzen and Stras)

[MURDER] [LIFE]