2011-191             State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Mahdi Hassan Ali, Appellant.

MAJORITY:  Two questions are presented in this appeal: (1) whether the denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment for murder for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is immediately appealable as of right; and (2) the appropriate evidentiary standard to be applied to the question of a defendant’s age on the date of the alleged offense.  We conclude that the denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is immediately appealable as of right.  We further conclude that the State bears the burden of proving the defendant’s age by a preponderance of the evidence.

This case arises out of the shooting deaths of three individuals at the Seward Market in Minneapolis on January 6, 2010.  On February 4, 2010, appellant Mahdi Hassan Ali was indicted on three counts of murder in the first degree in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2010) (premeditated murder) and three counts of murder in the first degree in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2010) (murder committed in the course of a felony) in connection with the deaths.  The indictment alleges that Ali was born on January 1, 1993, which would make him 17 years old on the date of the alleged offense and therefore automatically subject to trial in the district court under Minn. Stat. §§ 260B.101, subd. 2, and 260B.007, subd. 6(b) (2010).

HELD:  We conclude that when the age of the defendant determines the jurisdiction of the court, the State has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant’s age on the date of the alleged offense.

Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

CONCUR:  Justice Stras opined: “I join Part II of the court’s opinion.  I write separately, however, because I disagree with the court’s partial adoption of the collateral order doctrine in Part I.  With

respect to Part I, therefore, I concur only in the result.  

This court does not have unlimited jurisdiction to decide all cases and controversies.  To the contrary, the Minnesota Constitution, statutes, and procedural rules limit the scope of appellate jurisdiction.  Yet, instead of deciding this case on the basis of the Minnesota Constitution, a statute, or a rule of procedure, the court rests jurisdiction over this case on “[t]he unusual facts of this matter.”  As a result, the court declines to apply the collateral order doctrine to all interlocutory orders in criminal matters because, in its view, “the immediate appealability of pretrial orders in criminal cases is better addressed on a case-by-case basis, applying the rationale for the collateral order doctrine.”  I disagree with the court’s ad hoc approach for two reasons. 

Page (Gildea,  Paul Anderson, Meyer, Barry Anderson, Dietzen)

               Concur:  Stras

[MURDER]