2010-M-161             State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Mohammed Gazizamil Al-Naseer, Respondent.

BACKGROUND:  This was appellant’s fifth trip to the Minnesota Supreme Court after a conviction for vehicular homicide.

MAJORITY:  This case has a long and complicated procedural history.  Respondent, Mohammed Gazizamil Al-Naseer, was initially charged with two counts of criminal vehicular homicide in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(1) (2006) (gross negligence), and Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(7) (2006) (leaving the scene), as a result of a traffic accident that caused the death of Kane Thomson. 

A Clay County jury found Al-Naseer guilty on both counts and the district court subsequently convicted him of both counts, sentencing him to 48 months in prison.  On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the gross-negligence conviction but reversed the leaving-the-scene conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on the mens rea requirement.  State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer I), 678 N.W.2d 679, 694-97 (Minn. App. 2004).  After granting Al-Naseer’spetition for review, we affirmed the court of appeals‟ leaving-the-scene" decision but reversed the gross-negligence conviction because the district court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of careless driving.  State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer II), 690 N.W.2d 744, 750, 753 (Minn. 2005).

On remand, after a bench trial at which he waived his right to a jury trial and his right to testify, Al-Naseer was found guilty and convicted of both criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene) and careless driving, but found not guilty of criminal vehicular homicide (gross negligence). 

Al-Naseer again appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene) conviction and remanded for additional findings with respect to Al-Naseer’smens rea.  State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer III), 721 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2006).  Both the State and

Al-Naseer petitioned for review.  We granted the State’spetition but denied Al-Naseer’spetition.

Ultimately, we held that in order for a defendant to be found guilty of criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene), the State is required to prove that the defendant knew he had been involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle.  On that basis, we affirm[ed] the reversal of Al-Naseer’s conviction but remand[ed] to the district court to reconsider its verdict based on the present record and to make amended findings in light of the mens rea standard that requires proof that Al-Naseer knew that his vehicle was involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle.  State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer IV), 734 N.W.2d 679, 688-89 (Minn. 2007).

Before reconsidering its verdict on remand, the district court allowed the parties to submit briefs.  In his brief, Al-Naseer argued that, in light of the new standard we articulated in Al-Naseer IV, he was entitled to a new trial because his constitutional rights to notice of the charges against him and a fair opportunity to defend against those charges would be violated if the court made amended factual findings based on the existing record. 

The district court refused to consider these arguments, concluding that it did not have the authority to alter our mandate on remand.  Al-Naseer also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

Specifically finding that Al-Naseer knew he had been involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle, the court again found Al-Naseer guilty of the leaving-the-scene and careless-driving offenses.

Al-Naseer again appealed his leaving-the-scene conviction, and while the court of appeals found that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict, it also found that Al-Naseer was entitled to a new trial because his constitutional right to due process was violated by the district court’s failure to conduct a new trial.  State v. Al-Naseer (Al-Naseer V), No. 07-2275, 2009 WL 304738 (Minn. App. 2009). 

The State petitioned for review, challenging the court of appeals‟ grant of a new trial based on the denial of due process, and Al-Naseer cross-petitioned, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

We granted both petitions, requiring us to determine:  (1) whether Al-Naseer’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; and (2) whether Al-Naseer’s constitutional challenges were properly heard and correctly decided by the court of appeals.  Without reaching Al-Naseer’s constitutional challenges, we reverse.

To convict Al-Naseer of criminal vehicular homicide “leaving the scene,” the burden was on the State, and not Al-Naseer, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “Al-Naseer knew that his vehicle was involved in an accident with a person or another vehicle.”  Al-Naseer IV, 734 N.W.2d at 688-89.  Here, the circumstances proved permit a number of reasonable inferences, including inferences that support the conclusion that Al-Naseer knew that he had hit a person or a vehicle and inferences that support the opposite conclusions, i.e., that Al-Naseer did not know that he had hit a person or a vehicle.  The latter inferences are inconsistent with guilt and therefore create reasonable doubt as to Al-Naseer’sguilt.  See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 337 (Meyer, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson, 173 Minn. at 545-46, 217 N.W. at 683-84).  Because of that reasonable doubt, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support Al-Naseer’s conviction of criminal vehicular homicide-leaving the scene.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals

First, the heightened scrutiny applied to circumstantial evidence is not limited to cases in which every element required for conviction was proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.  Instead, the heightened scrutiny applies to any disputed element of the conviction that is based on circumstantial evidence.

Second, if from the circumstances proved it can reasonably be inferred that a driver did not know he had been in an accident with a person or another vehicle, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of criminal vehicular homicide (leaving the scene) under Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(7) (2008).

DISSENT:  Justices Gildea and Dietzen opined:  “I respectfully dissent.  The majority reverses Al-Naseer’s conviction because it concludes that the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis of innocence specifically, that “Al-Naseer did not know what he had hit when he left the scene of the accident.”  In my view, the only rational hypothesis supported by the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved is that Al-Naseer must have known he was in an accident with another vehicle.  I would also reverse the court of appeals‟ conclusion that Al-Naseer’s right to due process was violated.

Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support Al-Naseer’s conviction and the State did not violate Al-Naseer’s right to due process, I would affirm Al-Naseer’s conviction.

               Page (Paul Anderson, Meyer and Barry Anderson)

Dissent: Gildea and Dietzen, J. 

Took no part, Stras, J.

[MURDER CVH]