2010-M-159              Jerry Vang, a/k/a Vang Toua Xeng Vang, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

MAJORITY:  The juvenile court convicted and sentenced 14-year-old appellant Jerry Vang as an adult in this first-degree murder case.  Vang, who was indigent, made a timely request that the State Public Defender’s Office (SPDO) file a direct appeal on his behalf.  The SPDO did not file a direct appeal.  Well after the time to file a direct appeal expired, the SPDO filed a petition for post-conviction relief on behalf of Vang.  The post-conviction court denied Vang’s request for relief.  We hold that Vang’s convictions and sentences are void because the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence Vang as an adult.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand.  

 On August 7, 2001, Kor Vang met 14-year-old appellant Jerry Vang (Vang) at Vang’s house to drive together to a funeral.  On their way to the funeral, the two turned into an alley and saw several people, including Kao Vang and Kou Vang, “standing around.”  Kor, who was driving, stopped the car and backed up.  Vang and Kao “got into a verbal argument” regarding problems between their younger brothers.  Vang left the car, took out a loaded nine-millimeter gun, and shot Kao “six or seven times.”  Vang also shot Kou twice.  Vang returned to the car, and Kor drove the two to Chee Thao’s house, where Vang was arrested an hour later.  Although Kou survived the shooting, Kao did not.

First, In light of the exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of Vang’s case, we exercise our inherent authority to construe the proceedings as a direct appeal. 

Second, Vang’s convictions and sentences are void because the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence Vang as an adult. 

Reversed and remanded.

CONCUR:  Justices Dietzen and Gildea opined:  “I agree with the result reached by the majority, but I write separately to address my concern over a potential problem created by the opinion.  Specifically, a district judge may sometimes act as a district court judge with original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters; and other times act as a juvenile court judge with inferior jurisdiction and powers.  The potential problem with having a district judge wear different “hats” as a district court and juvenile court judge is that the judge must clarify on the record the capacity upon which the judge acts.  The root of the problem originated with the creation of the juvenile court, and therefore I turn to that history.

 The Minnesota Constitution provides that the district court “has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases.”  Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3.  It also provides for the office, among others, of district judges.  See Minn. Const. art. VI, § 4.  But the constitution also provides that the Legislature may create “such other courts, judicial officers and commissioners with jurisdiction inferior to the district court.”  Minn. Const. art. VI, § 1.

In 1905, the Legislature created a juvenile court, and a separate process for the handling of juvenile matters.  See Act of Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 285, 1905 Minn. Laws 418, 418-424.  In that Act, the Legislature provided the district court in counties having over 50,000 population with “original and exclusive jurisdiction” in juvenile cases.  Id. , § 2-3, 1905 Minn. Laws at 419.  The juvenile matters were to be handled in a special “juvenile court room” and one or more judges would be designated “to hear all cases arising under this act” for a period of one year, or until otherwise ordered.  Id.  

In the late 1950s, the chapter governing juvenile matters, although having been significantly modified, retained the language providing “original and exclusive jurisdiction” to the district court in counties with a population of more than 100,000 and requiring the district court to designate certain judges to act as the juvenile court for oneyear terms.  See Minn. Stat. §§ 260.02-.03 (1957).  

 Two cases in the late 1950s challenged Minn. Stat. ch. 260 as unconstitutional.  In State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957), we addressed the issue of whether chapter 260 was unconstitutional because it deprived the district court of jurisdiction to proceed against a juvenile when the proceedings held by the juvenile court were defective.  Similarly, in State ex rel. Pett v. Jackson, 252 Minn. 418, 90 N.W.2d 219 (1958), we were presented with the issue of whether a district court was without jurisdiction to proceed against a juvenile if the case was not first submitted to the juvenile court.  We held in both cases that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court did not violate the terms of Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3, which grant the district court original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases, because “[t]he procedures required [by the Juvenile Court Act] are those which must be followed before criminal jurisdiction comes into being.”  Knutson, 249 Minn. at 250, 82 N.W.2d at 237 (emphasis added); see also Pett, 252 Minn. at 421, 90 N.W.2d at 221.  Essentially, we held that the Juvenile Court Act did not violate the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the district court of all civil and criminal matters because juvenile delinquency is not criminal or civil.  

Since that time, the classification of juvenile delinquency cases as a matter distinct from any civil or criminal matter has been reinforced.  We clarified this distinction in In re the Welfare of K.A.A. when we stated “[w]e are unable to agree with any contention that article 6, section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution gives the district court jurisdiction over juveniles” because we concluded that “the legislature had the clear intent to make laws dealing with juvenile delinquency sui generis.”  410 N.W.2d 836, 838 n.4 (Minn. 1987).  And, in 2006, the Legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1 (2004), to state that the district courts have “original jurisdiction in the following cases:  . . . the jurisdiction of a juvenile court as provided in chapter 260.”  Act of July 1, 2006, ch. 260, art. 5, § 16, 2006 Minn. Laws 707, 778 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1 (2008)). 

This language is particularly relevant in defining the limited power of a district court judge sitting as a juvenile court judge because, unlike the other types of cases listed in section 484.01, subdivision 1, Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(5) (2008), limits the district court’s jurisdiction in juvenile cases to the “jurisdiction . . . as provided in chapter 260.”  

Although the Legislature has the power to establish separate “judicial officers and commissioners” to exclusively handle juvenile court matters, it has not done so.  Consequently, the judiciary uses district court judges to act as juvenile court judges.  When a district court judge acts as a juvenile court judge, that judge no longer has authority to act in certain ways—e.g., as a district court judge with the power to impose an adult sentence.  While I question whether the Legislature has the power to create a separate case type sui generis,1 and thereby limit the power of a district court judge when acting as a juvenile court judge,

I acknowledge our precedent upholding the Juvenile Court Act as constitutional, and the separate designation of an inferior juvenile court.  Thus, when a district court judge is acting as a juvenile court judge, that judge is limited by the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as provided in chapter 260.  As the court details in the majority opinion, the imposition of an adult sentence exceeds the authority granted by chapter 260.  Instead, the judge may, following specified procedures, transfer the case to district court for the juvenile to be tried as an adult, and only then may a criminal conviction be entered and an adult sentence may be imposed.  While those procedures may appear to exalt form over substance, the jurisdiction of a judge who fails to follow those procedures is limited to the jurisdiction provided in chapter 260. 

Therefore, I concur that Vang’s conviction and sentence must be reversed and the case must be remanded for further proceedings.

Meyer  (Page, Paul Anderson, and Barry Anderson)

               Concur:  Dietzen and Gildea

               Took no part:  Stras

               [MURDER]