2010-M-137             State of Minnesota vs. Tyeric Lamar Lessley.

MAJORITY:  The State of Minnesota challenges the denial of its motion to remove the Hennepin County District Court judge assigned to the trial of Tyeric Lamar Lessley.  Lessley has been charged with second-degree murder.  In a pretrial hearing, Lessley announced that he would waive his right to a jury trial.  The State made a motion for the judge to remove himself from presiding over Lessley’s trial.  The judge denied the motion.  Following this denial, the State asked the Chief Judge of the district to remove the judge.  The Chief Judge denied the request.  The State then made a motion to deny Lessley’s jury-trial-waiver request.  The trial judge denied the State’s motion and granted Lessley’s waiver request.  The State appealed the denial of its motions.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the State had failed to show that the challenged pretrial actions by the judge would have a “critical impact” on the outcome of the prosecution.  We granted review as to whether the State made the required threshold showing of critical impact, based on either the denial of the State’s request for a jury trial or the judge’s pretrial conduct.

First, a writ of prohibition was the appropriate procedure for the State to follow when challenging the denial of its motion to remove a district court judge.

Second, Article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution does not require the consent of the State before a defendant may waive a jury trial.

DISSENT:  Justices Gildea and Dietzen opined:  “I respectfully dissent.  The majority affirms the district court’s decision to allow a bench trial in this matter.  The district court granted Lessley’s request for a bench trial because it concluded that (1) the State did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, and (2) it would be an abuse of discretion to deny Lessley’s request.  The majority affirms the district court because it holds that Article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution does not apply to criminal cases, and therefore the State has no right to object to the defendant’s request for a bench trial.  In my view, we should resolve this case without reaching the constitutional question the majority decides.

We generally avoid reaching constitutional questions “if there is another basis on which a case can be decided.”  State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).  Following our general practice, I would resolve this case based on the language of the applicable criminal rule, Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01 (2009) (amended Feb. 11, 2010),2 and our precedent, rather than reaching the constitutional question.  Under the rule and our precedent, the district court abused its discretion in granting Lessley’s request, and I would therefore reverse.

I do not lightly come to the conclusion that a district court judge has abused his discretion.  But the facts of this case compel me to this result.   The State charged Lessley with intentional murder in the second degree for the shooting death of Darby Claar.  Pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.07, Lessley moved that the district court allow him to plead guilty to the lesser offense of second-degree manslaughter.  The court denied that motion by order dated October 14, 2008.  In the order, the court said that “the State’s evidence of intent is limited,” and that “[Lessley’s] remorse is . . . compelling.”  A few days later, Lessley, by submitting a request to waive a jury trial, asked this judge to be the finder of fact in his case.  Lessley’s desired fact-finder had earlier questioned the credibility of the State’s witnesses and characterized the case—on the record—as one involving “idiocy” and “a bunch of drunkards.”

The court’s ruling constitutes nothing more than a reflexive grant of Lessley’s request.  But we have repeatedly recognized that the defendant does not have an unconditional right to a bench trial.  E.g., State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 217-18 (Minn. 1995) (recognizing that “a defendant does not have an absolute right to waive jury”).   Rather, we have said that the court must, in the exercise of its sound discretion, decide whether to approve the request.

In summary, a defendant does not have an unconditional right to demand a bench trial.  Our criminal rule and precedent vest the decision of whether to approve such a request with the district court.  The court’s discretion is not constricted as the judge in this case suggested.  Rather, the court should consider all factors relevant to the question, including whether the available judge (or judges) is able to provide both parties a fair trial if he acts as the finder of fact, whether a bench trial will undermine the public’s confidence in the judicial process, and whether pretrial publicity or any other relevant facts have somehow rendered ineffective “ ‘the tribunal which the constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.’ ” Gaulke, 289 Minn. at 357, 184 N.W.2d at 601 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965)).  Applying these factors to the facts here, I would hold that it was an abuse of discretion to grant Lessley’s request for a bench trial.  

I reach this result because, in my view, to grant Lessley’s request risks undermining the public’s trust and confidence in our judicial system.  We have said that in order “to maintain public trust and confidence in the judiciary, judges . . .  should act to assure that parties have no reason to think their case is not being fairly judged.”  Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163-65 (Minn. 2002) (reversing order denying petition for post-conviction relief “[o]ut of concern that the process employed here gives the appearance of impropriety” where the district court “adopt[ed] verbatim the state’s proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order” exonerating the prosecutor of misconduct without affording the petitioner an opportunity to respond to the state’s proposed findings).  Because the judge “ ‘is vested with the responsibility to ensure the integrity of all stages of the proceedings[,]’ ” the judge must act so that he is viewed as “ ‘the neutral factor in the interplay of our adversary system . . . .’ ”

In this case, given the judge’s comments that I referenced above and the judge’s refusal to remove himself from the case, there was a basis for concern as to the appearance of the fairness of the proceeding if that judge acted as the fact-finder in this case.  See Linder, 304 N.W.2d at 905.  The record does not provide any countervailing factor that would support granting Lessley’s request for a bench trial.  For example, the record does not reflect any concerns over pretrial publicity.  The record likewise does not provide any other basis for me to conclude that “ ‘the tribunal which the constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result’ ” has been undermined so as to outweigh the appearance concerns the judge’s comments created.  Gaulke, 289 Minn. at 357, 184 N.W.2d at 601 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965)).

 I would therefore reverse and remand the matter for a jury trial. 

Paul Anderson  (Magnuson, Page, Meyer, and Barry Anderson)

               Dissent:  Gildea and Dietzen

               [MURDER]