2009-M-124              State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Lamonte Rydell Martin, Appellant.

MAJORITY:  Appellant Lamonte Martin was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder, and crime committed for the benefit of a gang, for the shooting death of Christopher Lynch.  Martin was automatically certified to stand trial as an adult.  A Hennepin County jury found him guilty of both counts.  The district court entered judgment of conviction of first-degree premeditated murder against Martin and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release.  We affirm.

First, the punishment of life in prison without the possibility of release for a juvenile who was 17 years of age when he committed the offense was not cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the United States or Minnesota Constitutions.

Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s motion for joinder of Martin and his codefendant’s cases for trial.

Third, the  district court properly followed the Batson analysis, and its decision to sustain the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of a potential African-American juror was not clearly erroneous.

Fourth, the  prosecutor did not commit misconduct during either the questioning of the witnesses or closing argument.  But even if misconduct occurred, it was either harmless, or did not affect Martin’s substantial rights.

Fifth, the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support a crime committed for the benefit of a gang is moot.

Sixth, the  issues Martin raises in his pro se brief lack merit.

DISSENT:  Justices Page and Paul Anderson opined:  “I respectfully dissent.  The court concludes that Juror 43 was justifiably stricken on a race-neutral basis because he believed that the criminal justice system was unfair to African Americans.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  Specifically, the court notes that the district court did not feel that Juror 43 was “forthcoming” because he could not provide evidence to support his belief that the system was unfair.  I conclude that when the views expressed by a prospective juror during voir dire are consistent with what this court has found in its own review of whether African Americans are treated unfairly in our judicial system, those views cannot constitute a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that would support the juror’s exclusion.

               Dietzen (Magnuson, Meyer, Barry Anderson, and Gildea)

               Dissent:  Page and Paul Anderson

[MURDER]