2007-M-057                State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. James Clinton Wren, Appellant.

MAJORITY:  Following a jury trial in Hennepin County District Court, appellant James Clinton Wren was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder for the deaths of Frank Haynes and Raleigh Robinson and one count of attempted first-degree murder.

First, the Court held that the district court’s granting of a motion to empanel an anonymous jury will not be reversed where the court took adequate precautions to minimize prejudice to appellant and no actual prejudice was demonstrated.  Second, the Court held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in overruling appellant’s Batson objections.  Third, the Court held that the prosecutor’s misconduct does not entitle appellant to a new trial.  Fourth, the Court held that the Appellant’s pro se issues do not warrant a new trial.

CONCUR: Justice Paul Anderson opined:  “I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I write separately for two reasons.  First, I consider the issue of whether the court erred as to the state’s peremptory strike of potential juror 57 to be a much closer question than does the majority.  The burden on the objecting party under step one of Batson is to show that a member of a protected racial group has been peremptorily excluded.  This step presents a relatively low hurdle for getting to steps two and three of the Batson analysis.  While I defer--with some reluctance--to the district court’s decision to decide this case under step one and thus do not urge a reversal, I write separately to again emphasize that the burden of proof under step one is quite low.  Given the consequences that follow when a court errs in its Batson analysis, courts must at all times approach step one of the Batson analysis with much diligence and never in a doubtful case stop at this step.

“The second reason I write separately is to indicate that on the anonymous jury question, I agree more with Justice Page’s analysis than with that of the majority.  That said, I nevertheless agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that Wren has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice that would lead to our granting a new trial based on this issue.”

DISSENT:  Justice Page opined:  “In Bowles, we stated that jury anonymity is not inherently prejudicial, as jurors  need not  take it as a sign that the defendant is guilty or especially dangerous, which would burden the defendant’s presumption of innocence and undermine his or her right to a fair trial.   Id. at 529-30. We explained that jurors are  as likely to  conclude that anonymity is employed to shield them from pressure from the media or the public.   Id.   Implied, but unstated in our explanation, is the fact that there is also  some likelihood  that the empanelling of an anonymous jury will result in jurors taking it as a sign that the defendant is guilty and/or not only dangerous but dangerous to the jurors.  Thus, even though we require courts to take certain precautions to lessen the potential for prejudice, id. at 531, and even though the practice is not inherently prejudicial, the potential for prejudice will always exist whenever an anonymous jury is used.”

                    Gildea (Russell Anderson, Hanson, Meyer, and Barry Anderson)

                    Concur:  Paul Anderson

                    Dissent:  Page

DATE OF DECISION:  September 13, 2007

RECORD NUMBER:  2007-129

FULL OPINION: 

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] 

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