Wife has Lover Kill her Husband

2006-M-02          State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Thanh Quan Tran, Appellant.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME:  Laura Xiong was having a sexual affair with Tranh Quan Tran.  On December 18, 2003, her husband Dao Xiong entered his empty home where he was shot three times in the back of the head.  The house was robbed of firearms, jewelry, and specific electronics.  Laura Xiong confessed that she and Tran had had sex in the marital home a few hours before the murder but stated that she and Tran had left the home before the murder.

Phone records disclosed between 10 and 25 calls per day between Tranh and Laura Xiong.  Motel records revealed assignations between the couple.  Financial records revealed massive debts for the man and the woman, although the victim earned over $100,000 per year.  Laura Xiong had a life insurance policy of $850,000 on her husband,  Tran’s roommate notified police that guns, jewelry, and specific electronics had been moved into their apartment shortly after Dao Xiong’s murder.

VERDICT:  The jury found Tran guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder, but not guilty of first-degree murder committed in the course of a burglary.  The district court entered judgment of conviction on the count of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced Tran to life in prison without parole.

THIS APPEAL:  Tran appealed on two grounds. 

First, he claimed that Minnesota should adopt a rule requiring prosecutors to produce more evidence of an insurance policy than is required before the admission of any other type of motive evidence.  He claimed there was no evidence that he knew of the insurance policy, or that he would benefit from it.

Second, Tran claimed that the district court abused its discretion in prohibiting him from eliciting evidence from police investigators about the alleged gang affiliation of Dao Xiong’s nephew C.S.X. who had argued with Dao Xiong a month before the murder.  Tran’s lawyer examined the police about other potential suspects at trial, but the trial court barred questions about any gang affiliation as being substantially more prejudicial than probative.  Police testified that the nephew’s DNA was different from that in blood found on a broken door at the murder scene.

THIS DECISION First, the Supreme Court noted that Laura Xiong had told police that she had informed police of the insurance policy.  “We conclude that, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that Tran knew of the insurance policy, the evidence of the insurance policy was relevant. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of the life insurance policy on Dao Xiong and the evidence of Laura Xiong’s financial difficulties.”

Second, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s discretion in excluding the evidence of the nephew’s gang affiliation.

The district court allowed Tran to elicit information regarding the November “deer party” incident, C.S.X.’s refusal to submit to DNA testing, and the investigator’s initial suspicions regarding C.S.X.. But the court concluded that testimony regarding C.S.X.’s alleged gang affiliation was barred by Minn. R. Evid. 403 because the gang affiliation evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative.  The record indicates that the court closely considered both the concerns of the state and the defense on the matter of introduction of evidence regarding C.S.X.  We conclude that Tran was able to introduce sufficient relevant evidence regarding C.S.X. to make clear to the jury Tran’s argument that the police had not properly investigated.  Here, the court correctly concluded that the gang affiliation evidence was only minimally probative and would have caused significant prejudice.  We conclude that the court’s decision to allow most of the evidence regarding C.S.X., but to prevent Tran from eliciting testimony regarding C.S.X’s gang affiliation, was not an abuse of discretion.

“Finally, we note that Tran’s attempt to introduce the gang affiliation evidence under the guise of criticizing the police investigation is problematic because it appears that Tran may be attempting to circumvent the rule we have recently articulated regarding alternative perpetrator evidence. We have held that alternative perpetrator evidence is not relevant and therefore inadmissible absent some evidence having an inherent tendency to connect the alternative perpetrator with the crime.  Here, C.S.X. was not being put forward as an alternative perpetrator; defense counsel admitted that Tran did not have sufficient evidence to tie C.S.X. to the crime and satisfy the alternative perpetrator standard. While the district court was correct that Tran was entitled to some latitude when questioning investigators regarding their lack of interest in other potential suspects, the court was also correct in its conclusion that delving too deeply into the prejudicial history of some of these suspects via cross-examination of the investigators is in essence bringing alternative perpetrator evidence in through the back door. Here, we want to emphasize that the alternative perpetrator rule cannot be circumvented in this manner.”

DATE OF DECISION:  April 20, 2006

RECORD NUMBER:  2006-077

FULL OPINION:  A05-26,

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] [CRIME] [INSURANCE] [AFFAIR]