2007-M-31
Timothy Michael Erickson, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State
of Minnesota, Respondent.
DESCRIPTION OF CRIME: On March 21, 1988,
Erickson and his brother shared a St. Cloud apartment where they sheltered
several younger homeless teens. The group had discussed forming a
“teenage vampire cult.” Donald Gall arrived at the Erickson apartment
"sloppy drunk.” There and at Riverside Park, the group continued to drink
and smoke marijuana through the night.
When Gall passed
out, Erickson recruited some of the group for the following actions.
Erickson clubbed Gall with a log while two others kicked him in the
ribs. Erickson slit Gall’s throat. Erickson and his accomplices
drank blood from the wound, licked blood from their hands, and robbed Gall’s
body of a leather jacket, a watch, a wallet, and other items. They dumped
the body in some open water in the frozen Mississippi River. They burned
the club, they stopped to buy cigarettes with Gall’s money and returned to the
apartment.
Erickson told
the two girls staying with the Erickson brothers that he had killed Gall by
beating him with a log and stabbing him with a knife and that he had thrown
Gall's body into the river. Erickson bragged that he had drunk Gall's blood and
licked the blood from his hands. Gall's blood-soaked jacket and the other
items taken from Gall were exhibited as proof of the crime.
That morning
Erickson’s brother described the killing to Benedict and that evening defendant
told Bill Benedict about the murder, saying that Gall's death was "not
really that big of a deal." At about 4:00 a.m. on March 24, 1988, a
drunken Benedict wandered into the St. Cloud Law Enforcement Center and
reported the murder. Gall's body was soon discovered floating in the river a
short distance downstream from the campsite, and shortly thereafter defendant
was arrested at the St. Cloud bus terminal. Erickson was taken to the
interrogation room at the law enforcement center where he was advised of his Miranda
rights. Defendant initially denied any involvement in the murder, but after
tests showed the presence of blood on his jacket and boots, defendant began to
cry and confessed to the murder. The initial confession was not recorded, but
defendant immediately repeated his confession to a police stenographer.
THE TRIAL: The trial was bifurcated. Erickson's
defense in the “guilt” phase of the trial was that voluntary intoxication had
rendered him incapable of forming an intention to murder. The jury found
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
In the second ”insanity
defense” phase of the trial, Erickson claimed that mental illness rendered him
incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that it was wrong. The jury
reaffirmed the guilty verdict. Erickson
was sentenced to life in prison.
THE DIRECT
APPEAL: On
December 22, 1989, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Erickson’s claims
that: 1) he was so intoxicated that he could not form the requisite
statutory intent or premeditation; 2) he had proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that mental illness had rendered him incapable of knowing the nature
of his act or its wrongfulness; and 3) the trial court erroneously admitted his
confession, which was coerced and taken in violation of his right to
counsel. Justice Coyne wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court.
THIS APPEAL: On Erickson’s first post-conviction
appeal, Erickson’s chaotic brief was reorganized
under five general grounds for relief: (1) denial of a fair trial; (2)
prosecutorial misconduct; (3) judicial misconduct; (4) ineffective assistance
of trial counsel; and (5) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Justice Gildea
joined the unanimous decision by Justice Sam Hanson to uphold Erickson’s
conviction and sentence.
In his reply brief Erickson concedes that many of the issues he
raised in his brief to this court “should have been raised during trial and or
during the appeal process.” We agree and conclude that Erickson’s claims
of denial of a fair trial, prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial misconduct
are procedurally barred under our post-conviction case law. We
have said that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised
therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a
subsequent petition for post-conviction relief.” State v. Knaffla,
309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). There are two exceptions
to the Knaffla rule: (1) if a novel legal issue is presented, or (2) if
the interests of justice require review.
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Erickson’s
claims regarding his alleged denial of a fair trial.
Erickson’s claims of denial of a fair trial were known and could
have been raised on direct appeal. The post-conviction petition
demonstrates that the evidentiary source for these claims is the transcript of
the pretrial and trial proceedings. Further, Erickson does not argue for,
and these claims do not fit, either Knaffla exception—they are not novel
because the legal basis to bring them was available on direct appeal.
Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Erickson’s
claims regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
Erickson’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct were known and could
have been raised on direct appeal. The post-conviction petition
demonstrates that the evidentiary source for these claims is the transcript of
the pretrial and trial proceedings. Further, Erickson does not argue for,
and these claims do not fit, either Knaffla exception—they are not novel
because the legal basis to bring them was available on direct appeal.
Third, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Erickson’s
claims regarding alleged judicial misconduct.
Erickson’s claims of judicial misconduct were known and could have
been raised on direct appeal. The post-conviction petition demonstrates
that the evidentiary source for these claims is the transcript of the pretrial
and trial proceedings. Further, Erickson does not argue for, and these
claims do not fit, either Knaffla exception—they are not novel because
the legal basis to bring them was available on direct appeal.
Fourth, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Erickson’s
claims regarding alleged ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.
Erickson’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims,
including the right to be present at pretrial conferences, attorney conflicts
of interest, and counsel’s failure to follow Erickson’s instructions, are based
on the trial record and are Knaffla- barred. Erickson’s claims are
not novel because they were available to Erickson during his direct
appeal. And Erickson has not provided any reasons justifying application
of the fairness exception
Fifth, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Erickson’s
claims regarding alleged ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.
Erickson also argues that he received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. He suggests two grounds: (1) that his counsel “did not
introduce material” that he should have introduced during the direct appeal;
and (2) that his counsel refused to continue to represent him after completion
of his direct appeal. This claim is not procedurally barred under Knaffla
because it could not have been raised on direct appeal. But Erickson has
not alleged sufficient facts in support of the claim to warrant an evidentiary
hearing.
DATE OF DECISION: January 4, 2007
RECORD NUMBER: 2007-003
DESCRIPTION: [MURDER]
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