2006-M-10 State
of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Darryl Colbert, Appellant.
DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME: On December 26, 2003, Colbert shot and killed Robert
Mitchell who was trying to buy a television for $50 from the trunk of Colbert’s
car in Minneapolis.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS: In November, 2004, Colbert’s first trial ended in a hung
jury. In February, 2005, a jury found him guilty of premeditated
first-degree murder and the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment.
On this direct appeal, Colbert raised three issues: (1) the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred
when it failed to dismiss the case based on an alleged discovery violation by
the state during trial; and (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial
misconduct.
THIS DECISION: Justice Gildea joined the unanimous opinion by Justice Page
to uphold Colbert’s conviction and sentence.
First, the Supreme Court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient
to convict him of first-degree murder. This case involved circumstantial
evidence. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence is entitled to
the same weight as direct evidence. However, a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence will stand only if the circumstantial evidence forms a
complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to
the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any
reasonable inference other than that of guilt.
We conclude that the evidence leads so directly to Colbert’s guilt
as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than
guilt. Colbert was seen arriving at Sunny’s on
December 26, 2003, at 5:33 p.m. wearing a brimmed, fedora-style hat and a long
topcoat. A Sunny’s surveillance videotape from that evening shows Colbert talking
to Mitchell at 5:50 p.m. Washington testified that she heard a part of the
conversation between Colbert and Mitchell in which $50 was mentioned. Washington
also saw Colbert leaving Sunny’s with Mitchell, and a videotape from Sunny’s
surveillance system shows Mitchell and Colbert exiting Sunny’s
side-by-side at 6:13 p.m.
Rogers testified that Mitchell was going to buy a television for
$50 and was leaving with someone named Darryl. Shortly after
Colbert and Mitchell left Sunny’s, three individuals witnessed two cars parked trunk-to-trunk
approximately one and one-half blocks away from Sunny’s on
the 2800 block of Columbus Avenue. One of the cars was described
as an older model white car with a boxed-shaped or “squared-off” back
end. Two men were standing near the cars. The
witnesses saw one of the men, who was wearing a dark, brimmed hat and a long,
dark topcoat, shoot the other man. The shooter drove away in the
older model white car. Colbert drives a white, 1988 Chrysler New Yorker, which
witnesses testified was similar to the shooter’s car. Two of the witnesses called 911
immediately after the shooting. The first call was logged at 6:17 p.m. At
6:21 p.m., a white Chrysler New Yorker was videotaped by Sunny’s
external video surveillance system driving past Sunny’s on
Chicago Avenue. Colbert admitted that the white Chrysler New Yorker seen
driving past Sunny’s belonged to him and that he was driving it.
The next day, a gun, which forensic experts determined was
involved in Mitchell’s shooting, was used in the shooting involving Colbert and Parker. Parker
testified that Colbert brought the gun to M. Colbert’s
apartment, shot Parker, and during an ensuing struggle for the gun, Colbert
himself was shot. While Colbert’s version of the events leading to
him being shot by Parker had Parker bringing the gun to the apartment and
shooting Colbert, the jury was free to, and evidently did, reject Colbert’s
version of these events.
Second. Colbert claimed that he was denied a fair trial when the state
committed a discovery violation by not timely disclosing a change in the
forensic video analyst’s opinion about the coat seized in the search of Colbert’s
apartment. Colbert asserts that the state’s failure to timely disclose the
change in the video analyst’s opinion entitles him to dismissal or a new trial. We
disagree.
According to the state, on January 25, 2005, while one of its
prosecutors was preparing the analyst for testimony the next day in Colbert’s
second trial, the prosecutor asked the analyst whether he could exclude the
coat seized from [Colbert’s apartment] as the coat observed on the December [26]
surveillance video. The analyst definitively stated that the two coats were not the
same. At 7:01 p.m. that evening, the prosecutor sent an email to
Colbert’s attorney informing him that the analyst had expressly stated
that the two coats were not the same. The analyst testified to that effect on
January 27, 2005. The state claims that before the analyst testified on
January 27, the prosecutor had a conversation with Colbert’s
attorney in which Colbert’s attorney said something to [the prosecutor] about he’s going
to say it’s not the coat, or something like that, which led [the prosecutor]
to believe that [Colbert’s attorney] had that e-mail and had the information
that the prosecution had emailed to him on January 25.
The analyst’s testimony at the second trial that the two coats were
definitively not the same coat was simply an extension of the theory the state
had maintained throughout both trials that although the coat seized from
Colbert’s apartment was likely not the coat he wore on December 26, it was
similar in style and represented a type of coat Colbert likes to wear. Thus,
we conclude that the state did not change its theory of the case between the
two trials as it related to the coat worn by Colbert on the night Mitchell was
murdered and the coat seized from Colbert’s apartment, and therefore Colbert
was not prejudiced by any alleged discovery violation.
Third, Colbert claimed that the prosecuting attorney engaged in
misconduct by (1) improper reference to Colbert’s
exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial and (2) improper
reference to Colbert’s sexual infidelity.
During Colbert’s cross-examination, the prosecutor pointed out that Colbert had “sat
through the entire trial,” had the opportunity to hear the testimony of a number of
witnesses, and had been provided with police reports, surveillance videos,
photos, and transcripts from other proceedings. Colbert made no objection to
any of the cross-examination he now claims implicated his Sixth Amendment right
to be present at trial. Therefore, our review is for plain error. When
assessing whether plain error occurred, we ask whether (1) there was error, (2) the error
was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s
substantial rights. Error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the misconduct in question “would have had a significant effect
on the verdict of the jury.
If all three requirements are met, we assess whether we
should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial
proceedings. We are satisfied, on the record presented and given the
limited nature of the cross-examination that might have violated Colbert’s
rights under the Sixth Amendment, that any possible misconduct did not affect
Colbert’s substantial rights.
We need not analyze Colbert’s remaining claims of prosecutorial
misconduct in detail. It is enough to say that we have carefully reviewed the record as
it relates to those claims and conclude that if any of the conduct underlying
the claims constituted prosecutorial misconduct, none of the conduct as
alleged, whether viewed as discrete instances of misconduct or collectively, was
so serious or prejudicial as to deny Colbert a fair trial.
Colbert’s three sets of claims have failed and his conviction and
sentence are sustained.
DATE OF DECISION: July 6, 2006
RECORD NUMBER: 2006-112
DESCRIPTION: [MURDER] [ROBBERY]
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