2006-M-03 State
of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Charles Ray Barnes, Appellant.
DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME: On July 13, 2004, Burnsville police responded to an
emergency call from Barnes. He said he had just returned to find his
ex-wife Erin Rooney unconscious from either alcohol or heroin. He had
tried to revive her, following directions from the police dispatcher.
Barnes changed his story to say they had dined together and that he had slept
from nine to midnight and awoke to find her unconsciousness. After EMTs
arrived, she was pronounced dead.
The next day, the coroner found that Rooney’s hyoid bone in her
throat was fractured, hemorrhaging in her neck, pettachaiae (blood speckles in
her eyes), defensive injuries on her hands, bruises on her throat, swelling in
her face, and other evidence consistent with strangulation.
Barnes was found guilty of first-degree domestic abuse murder;
second-degree unintentional felony murder; and first-degree felony assault. He
was sentenced to life in prison based on the first-degree domestic abuse murder
conviction.
THIS APPEAL: On this first, direct appeal, Barnes raised a
number of claims that were denied when Justice Gildea joined a unanimous
opinion by Justice Sam Hanson.
THIS DECISION: First, the Supreme Court rejected Barnes’
claim that the law he was convicted of breaking (first-degree domestic-abuse
murder) prohibits the same conduct as another crime (third-degree depraved-mind
murder) that has a shorter recommended sentence.
In the first place, the Supreme Court noted that first-degree
domestic-abuse murder focuses on a specific type of criminal misconduct - death
while committing domestic abuse - while depraved mind murder is much more broad
- death while perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others.
In the second place, the Supreme Court held that domestic- abuse
murder is more specific because it only applies to (1) a specific group of
defendants who cause the death of (2) a specific group of victims. Domestic
abuse murder only applies to defendants who have engaged in a past pattern of
domestic abuse upon the victim. Depraved mind murder applies
to any defendant. Domestic abuse murder only applies with a victim who
had a domestic relationship with the defendant. Depraved mind murder, on
the other hand, can apply with any person as the victim.
In the third place, the Supreme Court noted that the statutes can
also be distinguished because the “criminal intent” elements have a different
focus. Domestic abuse murder requires that the extreme indifference be directed
at the specific person. Depraved mind murder, on the other hand, cannot occur where
the defendant’s actions were focused on a specific person: This statute
was intended to cover cases where the reckless or wanton acts of the accused
were committed without special regard to their effect on any particular
person or persons; the act must be committed without a special design upon
the particular person or persons with whose murder the accused is charged. “
In the fourth place, the Supreme Court held that the intent
requirement for domestic-abuse murder requires a specific intent to harm a
victim in a domestic relationship, while a depraved-mind murder only required a
reckless attitude to do dangerous acts. For these four reasons, the
Supreme Court held that the two statutes were intended to punish different
kinds of criminal conduct and thus the Equal Protection clause does not
prohibit punishment for first-degree domestic-abuse murder.
Second, the Supreme Court rejected Barnes’ claim that the first-degree
domestic-abuse murder law violates equal protection because, without a rational
basis, it singles out domestic abusers for harsher punishment than those who
commit depraved mind murder.
In the first place, the Supreme Court applied a “rational basis”
test to analyze the constitutionality of the different treatment given to
domestic abusers charged with first-degree murder. This was applied
because Barnes admitted that his claim was not based on defendants who were
members of a suspect class and did not involve a defendant’s fundamental
rights. So, this will lead a court to rule that a criminal law is
constitutional if the classification drawn by [the statute] is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest.
In the second place, the Supreme Court held that the obvious
purpose of the domestic abuse murder statute is to combat domestic violence. This
is certainly a legitimate legislative goal. And providing harsher
punishment for those who have a past pattern of domestic abuse serves that
goal. So, the Supreme Court held that imposing a harsher penalty on
domestic abusers for intentional conduct resulting in death than on persons
with depraved minds for reckless conduct resulting in death was both rational
and constitutional.
Third, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Barnes’ motion for a continuance to secure an expert
witness. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court had approved funds for
such an expert witness, has made many concessions to Barnes to provide access
to Barnes’ expert during the trial, heard no justification for a continuance
and no explanation for the sudden absence of the expert at the end of the
State’s case.
Fourth, the Supreme Court rejected Barnes’ claim that he had ineffective
assistance of counsel because his lawyer was “surprised” by the coroner’s
testimony that Barnes had used such force on Erin Rooney’s throat that he had
not merely cracked her hyoid bone but fractured it. The Supreme Court
found that the defense lawyer’s reaction was a performance that “falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Fifth, the Supreme Court rejected Barnes argument that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree assault
because each of the injuries could have been explained by other causes.
The state’s expert witnesses ruled out each of these other causes of injury
with “scientific certainty,” giving their opinions that the cause
of death was “strangulation.” The evidence was sufficient.
Sixth, the Supreme Court rejected Barnes’ argument that the prosecutor
violated his rights during closing argument by giving an unqualified medical
reason as to why Barnes vomited, and by giving a purely hypothetical and
unwitnessed blow by blow account of a fight that the state claimed had occurred
between Barnes and Rooney. The Supreme Court disagreed.
The state’s closing argument can include reasonable inferences from the
evidence. The totality of the evidence shows that he started
getting sick because he was afraid. Further, each of the prosecutor’s
remarks about the fight and how Rooney sustained various injuries was supported
by medical testimony.
Seventh, the Supreme Court rejected Barnes’ argument that the district
court erred by not declaring a mistrial when one of the officers commented on a
conversation he had with Barnes about Barnes’ past drug use. The disclosure
was inadvertent. The trial court gave an immediate instruction to the
jury to ignore that testimony. The Supreme Court found the testimony was
more than offset by two weeks of testimony about Barnes’ past domestic abuse
crimes, his changing stories to police, the physical evidence of the crime, and
other testimony.
Eighth, the Supreme Court rejected Barnes’ argument that the police
violated his rights because they did not test vomit in the toilet. Barnes
said this was important because the vomit could have been from Rooney and one
of the experts conceded that vomiting can cause petechiae, a condition found in
the autopsy. But even if the vomit was from Rooney, (1) the state’s
experts ruled out vomiting as the cause of Rooney’s petechiae, and (2) none of her
other injuries could have been explained by the vomit. Thus,
the failure of the state to test the vomit did not violate Barnes’
rights.
Ninth, the Supreme Court rejected Barnes’ argument that the trial court
erred by not declaring a mistrial during jury selection when a potential juror
brought to the court’s attention an incident where other potential jurors were
discussing Barnes’ guilt or innocence. He argues that the court
excused a certain pool of jurors instead of all of them. But
Barnes failed to order a transcript of the jury selection and the state did not
stipulate to the facts claimed by Barnes. Because Barnes’
arguments are not supported in the record, the issue is deemed waived.
DATE OF DECISION: April 27, 2006
RECORD NUMBER: 2006-078
DESCRIPTION: [MURDER][DOMESTIC]
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