2006-M-21 State
of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. John Russell Heden, Appellant.
DESCRIPTION OF CRIME: On March 1, 2004, appellant John Russell Heden dialed 911
to report that his three-month-old daughter, Rose, was not breathing.
Emergency responders arrived within minutes, but they were unable to revive
Rose, who was not breathing, had no pulse, and had blood coming out of her
nose. When a paramedic informed Heden that further resuscitation efforts
would be futile, he responded by shrugging his shoulders and making a statement
to the effect that, unfortunately, bad things happen. This was in
Pennington County, near Thief River Falls.
Heden confessed to shaking the infant’s head repeatedly. The
autopsy showed she had died of a shaken-baby assault. It also showed a
vaginal laceration. Heden confessed that he had been woken by Rose’s
crying, he calmed her with a bottle and a pacifier, he had hurt her when he inserted his
finger in her vagina, then shook her into unconsciousness.
THE TRIAL: On April 4, 2005, a Pennington County jury found John
Russell Heden guilty of first-degree murder—criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(2) (2004); first-degree murder—child
abuse, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(5) (2004); and
second-degree felony murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd.
2(1) (2004), for the March 1, 2004 “shaken infant” death of his three-month-old
daughter.
The district court then convicted Heden of first-degree
murder—criminal sexual conduct and sentenced him to life imprisonment without
the possibility of release.
THIS APPEAL: Justice Gildea joined the unanimous decision by Justice
Paul Anderson on this direct appeal to uphold Heden’s conviction and sentence.
“Heden raised seven issues on this direct appeal and asks us to
reverse and dismiss the charge of first-degree murder—criminal sexual conduct
and remand for a new trial on first-degree murder—child abuse and second-degree
felony murder. We affirm.”
First, Heden claimed the court erred in denying Heden’s motion to
suppress his statement to the police. We must determine whether Heden was
in custody without a Miranda warning before he made the statements to which he
objected.
In reviewing the circumstances to determine whether a suspect was
in custody, we look to many factors.
Here, the factors involved lead to a mixed result. Some
factors support a finding that Heden was not in custody. Heden was
neither under arrest nor informed that he was the prime suspect during the part
of the statement at issue. During the 27-minute interrogation, Heden was
unrestrained, was either standing or seated on a bed, and looking down at
Hodapp, who was seated in a chair approximately four to five feet away.
Although there were other police officers in the house, only Hodapp was in the
room during the interrogation. At no point did any officer draw a weapon
in Heden’s presence.
That Heden made a significantly incriminating statement is a
factor that supports a finding that, from that point on, Heden was in
custody. But it is not, as Heden argues, dispositive. We
have rejected a bright line rule that when a suspect makes a significantly
incriminating statement, that statement automatically converts a noncustodial
interrogation into a custodial interrogation. In Champion, we
concluded that an admission to the police that the suspect had suffocated the
murder victim did not automatically convert the interview from noncustodial to
custodial.
We conclude that while the applicable factors lead to a mixed
result, the overall circumstances of the interrogation indicate that the court
did not clearly err in finding that a reasonable person in these circumstances
would believe he was not in custody to the degree associated with arrest.
The court applied the proper legal standard. As previously noted, when
the district court applies the proper legal standard, we grant considerable
deference to the court’s fact-specific resolution. Therefore, we hold
that the court did not err in denying Heden’s motion to suppress that part of
his third interview given before he received the Miranda warning.
Second, Heden claimed the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that Heden’s digital penetration of the victim was done “with force or
violence” as required by the statute.
We have held that in order to prove that a defendant caused the
death of a human being while committing criminal sexual conduct, “the state
must prove that ‘the “fatal wound” was inflicted during the same “chain of
events” [in which the underlying felony took place] so that the requisite time,
distance, and causal relationship between the felony and killing are
established.’” “So long as the underlying felony and the
killing are part of one continuous transaction, it is irrelevant whether the
felony took place before, after, or during the killing.”
From the time Shawna left for work at approximately 5:15 a.m. until 6:40 a.m.
when Heden dialed 911, Heden was the only person with access to Rose except for
Rose’s five-year-old half-sister, who was asleep. Dr. McGee testified
that Rose’s fatal injuries were consistent with having been inflicted between
6:00 a.m. and 6:40 a.m. By Heden’s own statement to Hodapp, he awoke to
Rose’s crying and tried unsuccessfully to calm her by giving her a bottle and
then a pacifier. Heden then digitally penetrated Rose three times “to see
if that’d make any difference on her.” When nothing stopped Rose from
crying, Heden said he lost control and shook her.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
that a jury could reasonably have found that Heden shook Rose to death during
the same “chain of events” as the digital penetration “so that the requisite
time, distance, and causal relationship” between the criminal sexual conduct
and the killing has been established.
We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove
that Heden caused the death of Rose while committing first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. Having previously concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support a finding that the digital penetration of Rose was done
“with force or violence,” we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support
Heden’s conviction of causing the death of a human being while committing
criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or
violence.
Third, Heden claimed the imposition of a life sentence without the
possibility of release for conviction of first-degree murder—criminal sexual
conduct violates the Eighth Amendment, equal
protection and due process.
We are asked to determine whether Heden’s sentence is so excessive
and disproportionate to the crime that it constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment in violation of Article I, Section 5, of the Minnesota
Constitution.
Heden was sentenced under Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2(1)
(2004), which provides for a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of
release for anyone convicted of first-degree murder while committing or
attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct. “Statutes are
presumed constitutional, and a person challenging a sentence as cruel or
unusual ‘bears the “heavy burden” of showing that our culture and laws
emphatically and well-nigh universally reject’ the sentence.”
We recently addressed and rejected an identical claim in Gutierrez.
Paul Gutierrez, like Heden, was convicted of first-degree murder while
committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second
degree.
Gutierrez was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of release. On appeal, Gutierrez claimed that his sentence
constituted cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Minnesota
Constitution. Id. We rejected Gutierrez’s claim. Id.
Heden, like Gutierrez, fails to show that “our culture and laws emphatically
and well-nigh universally reject” his sentence. We therefore hold that
Heden’s sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release does not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment.
Fourth, Heden claimed the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that Heden caused the victim’s death while committing first-degree
criminal sexual conduct.
This issue was resolved by our holding on Heden’s second claim.
Fifth, Heden claimed the court erred when it instructed the jury that
Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(5) (2004) requires the state to prove a “past pattern
of child abuse” beyond a reasonable doubt but does not require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of each act constituting the pattern,
Because we have affirmed Heden’s conviction of first-degree
murder—criminal sexual conduct, we need not address Heden’s arguments regarding
the jury’s finding of guilt on first-degree murder—child abuse.
Sixth, Heden claimed the evidence was insufficient to support finding of
a “past pattern of child abuse.”
Because we have affirmed Heden’s conviction of first-degree
murder—criminal sexual conduct, we need not address Heden’s arguments regarding
the jury’s finding of guilt on first-degree murder—child abuse.
Seventh, Heden claimed the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on
the definition of “pattern.”
Because we have affirmed Heden’s conviction of first-degree
murder—criminal sexual conduct, we need not address Heden’s arguments regarding
the jury’s finding of guilt on first-degree murder—child abuse.
DATE OF DECISION: August 10, 2006
RECORD NUMBER: 2006-143
DESCRIPTION: [MURDER] [CHILD ABUSE] {SEX] [DOMESTIC]
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