2006-M-30 State
of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Demetrius Devell Dobbins, Appellant.
DESCRIPTION OF CRIME: On December 5, 2003, drug dealer Dobbins lured drug dealer
Quintin Roderick Lavender to Dobbin’s home in Columbia Heights. The two
men argued about $60 that Lavender had owed to Dobbins for over six
months. Dobbins shot Lavender to death, moved the body to a shed behind
the house, and left with an accomplice to get accelerants to burn down the
house and the shed.
A tip brought police to the house with a claim of murder and a
description of two men who might soon return to the crime scene. Police
confronted Dobbins and Mysohn King coming up the driveway of the house while
bearing accelerants.
THE TRIAL: On November 5, 2004, the jury found Dobbins guilty of
first-degree premeditated murder. The district court then convicted
Dobbins of this offense and sentenced him to life in prison.
Evidence included: Lavender’s body; Lavender’s blood in the
shed, in the bedroom, in the bathtub, on the den’s carpet, 0n the mop, on the
cleaning rags in garbage bags, and on Dobbins’ clothes; the bags of
accelerants; the gunshot residue on Dobbins’ hands and clothing; King’s
testimony that he was willing to cooperate with Dobbins was because Dobbins
killed Lavender “over nothin’” and “what happened was wrong;” the testimony of
Dobbins girlfriend that she heard Dobbins tell his cousin to “bring it” and the
cousin brought a gun to Dobbins’ house; the testimony of one of Dobbins’
girlfriend’s sisters that Dobbins had told her that “he shot [Lavender]”
because Lavender owed him money;” and the testimony of one of Dobbins’ girlfriend’s sisters that
Dobbins
THIS APPEAL: Justice Gildea joined the 4-3 opinion by Justice Paul Anderson
which upheld the conviction and sentence of Dobbins.
On this direct appeal, Dobbins raised four issues:
(1) whether the district court erred
in allowing the only African-American venire-person to be struck from serving
on the jury;
(2) whether the court violated
Dobbins’ Sixth Amendment right to effectively cross-examine a key state’s
witness;
(3) whether the court erred in
not instructing the jury that Dobbins’ girlfriend could have been considered an
accomplice; and
(4) whether the state’s misconduct
denied Dobbins a fair trial, or in the alternative, whether defense counsel’s
failure to object to the misconduct constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.
First, The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Dobbins’ claim that the
district court erred in allowing the only African-American venire-person to be
struck from serving on the jury. The Supreme Court engaged in extensive
review and analysis of the trial court’s review and analysis of both the
prosecution’s intent and the potential juror’s answers to questions.
“Here, the court not only clearly articulated the steps in its Batson
analysis, but also based its lack-of-purposeful-discrimination determination on
its observation that there was nothing “in the demeanor or the questioning” of the
state that would indicate that the state was attempting to single out
prospective jurors based on their race. Examining the court’s reasoning
for allowing the strike in light of the required deference to that court, we
hold that the court’s conclusion that Dobbins failed to prove purposeful
discrimination by the state was not clearly erroneous.”
Second, The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Dobbins’ claim that the
court violated Dobbins’ Sixth Amendment right to effectively cross-examine a
key state’s witness.
“Here, King pleaded guilty to aiding an offender as an
accomplice-after-the-fact to Dobbins. The state made a motion in limine
to prohibit Dobbins from referring to the exact number of months King’s
potential prison term was being reduced in exchange for his truthful
testimony. The district court considered our court’s holding in Greenleaf
and ruled that Dobbins could not inquire about the exact number of months
King’s potential sentence was reduced, but could cross-examine about other
aspects of the plea agreement, including the extent to which King was “getting
a significant reduction in his potential sentence.” Additionally, King
admitted that he could potentially receive a 75 percent lesser sentence as a
result of the plea bargain. Based on this record, we conclude that our
holding and reasoning in Greenleaf applies to the instant case.
Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err when it prohibited
Dobbins from cross-examining King regarding the exact number of months that
King’s sentence would be reduced as a result of King’s plea agreement with the
state.”
Third, The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Dobbins’ claim that the
court erred in not instructing the jury that Dobbins’ girlfriend could have
been considered an accomplice.
Dobbins’ argued that the district court committed reversible error
by failing to instruct the jury that Dobbins’ girlfriend may be considered an
accomplice. The decision to give a jury instruction lies within the
discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
that discretion.
We conclude that the evidence indisputably indicates that Dobbins’
girlfriend was not an accomplice to the murder. The record does not
support Dobbins’ argument on appeal that his girlfriend was involved in
bringing Lavender to Dobbins’ house, and there is no evidence that she talked
to Lavender at City Center or even knew him. She played no role in
Coleman bringing the gun to the house and she was not in the house when the
shooting occurred. Because there was no testimony that Dobbins’
girlfriend participated in the murder, we conclude that Dobbins was not
entitled to a jury instruction that his girlfriend could be considered an
accomplice to the murder. Therefore, we hold that the court did not err
by withholding a jury instruction that Dobbins’ girlfriend may be considered an
accomplice to the murder.”
Fourth, The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Dobbins’ claim that the
state’s misconduct denied Dobbins a fair trial.
“Because Dobbins’ murder conviction was surely unattributable to
the objected-to prosecutorial misconduct regarding Dobbins’ constitutional
right of confrontation and that the unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct did
not affect Dobbins’ substantial rights, the cumulative effect of the state’s
misconduct did not deprive Dobbins of a fair trial. We therefore decline
to grant Dobbins a new trial on the basis of the cumulative effect of all the
prosecutorial misconduct. We note that the Constitution guarantees a fair
trial—not a perfect or error-free trial.”
Fifth, The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Dobbins’ claim that defense
counsel’s failure to object to the misconduct constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.
“Dobbins’ last argument is that his trial counsel’s failure to
object to the prosecutorial misconduct identified above constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. To succeed in an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a convicted defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Jackson, 714
N.W.2d 681, 697 (Minn. 2006). In the instant case, because the
prosecutorial misconduct at issue did not affect the outcome of Dobbins’ trial,
Dobbins was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to object. As
such, Dobbins’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim also fails.”
DATE OF DECISION: December 28, 2006
RECORD NUMBER: 2006-209
DESCRIPTION: [MURDER]
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