2007-M-052                State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Edison Joseph Mahkuk, Appellant, and Edison Joseph Mahkuk, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

MAJORITY:  A Hennepin County jury found Mahkuk guilty of one count of first-degree premeditated murder and one count of first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang for both the death of Benjamin and the death of Burns.  The district court merged the two counts with respect to each victim, entered judgments of conviction for first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang for each victim, and sentenced Mahkuk to two consecutive terms of life in prison.  On this direct appeal,  the Court reversed the convictions.

First, the Court held that he trial court’s instruction on aiding and abetting was error that relieved the state of its burden to prove an element of the charged offense and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, the Court held that a trial court’s partial closure of a courtroom must satisfy the standard set forth in Waller v. Georgia, and thus must be supported by the trial court’s evidentiary findings and remanded for

Third, the Court held that the use of gang expert testimony to prove the charged crime was committed for the benefit of a gang did not exceed the permissible scope of gang expert testimony set out in our case law. 

Fourth, the Court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that the state could elicit testimony regarding the defendant’s previous arrest.  Fifth, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to accept the defendant’s stipulation that he was a member of a criminal gang.  Sixth, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to declare a mistrial when a state’s witness offered testimony that violated the court’s order.

CONCUR:  Justice Meyer opined: “I concur in the decision of the majority because even under the “substantial reason” standard, I would conclude that the standard for closing the courtroom in this case has not been met.  There is no testimony or evidence from any witness indicating that he or she has been intimidated or threatened.  Nor is there evidence indicating who was intimidating or threatening witnesses or the nature of those threats.  In fact, other than her demeanor while testifying, there is no testimony from White indicating that she felt intimidated or threatened.  Instead, the record simply contains statements from the prosecution indicating that White felt intimidated.  That is not evidence.  Without specific findings about who was being intimidated and the nature of the intimidation, it is impossible to determine whether partial closure was proper.  Therefore, I agree with the majority that we cannot conclude that the closure decision by the trial court was proper, absent evidence in the record and adequate findings by the trial court.”

                    Page (Russell Anderson, Paul Anderson, Hanson, Barry Anderson, and Gildea)

                    Concur: Meyer

DATE OF DECISION:  August 9, 2007

RECORD NUMBER:  2007-113

FULL OPINION: 

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] 

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2007-M-051                State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Detroit Davis, Jr., Appellant.

A Hennepin County jury found appellant Detroit Davis, Jr., guilty of first- and second-degree murder respectively for the shooting death of Richard Allan; for second-degree murder for the shooting death of Pablo Morocho; and attempted aggravated robbery.  The jury returned a not-guilty verdict on the charge of first-degree murder in the death of Morocho.  On this direct appeal, the Court upheld these convictions

First, the Court held that it would not consider changing its precedents, rules and procedures for judges to consider before admitting evidence about prior convictions.  During trial, the court heard arguments regarding whether evidence of nine felony offenses for which Davis had been convicted was admissible.   Defense counsel objected to the admission of the evidence, arguing that some of the nine convictions were outside the ten-year period set out in the rule, that the offenses had limited impeachment value, that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and that, if the evidence of the offenses was found to be admissible, that finding would have a chilling effect on Davis’s willingness to testify on his own behalf.  The district court found that five of the convictions were admissible under Rule 609 and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice.  The district court made it clear that the jury would be instructed on the proper use of the evidence.  The Court rejected Davis’ claim that new rules were needed on how to weigh such evidence.

Second, during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Davis a series of questions that suggested that Davis’s testimony was not credible because he had access to the discovery materials in his case and had heard all the evidence presented against him during the trial, which gave Davis an opportunity to tailor his story to that evidence.  Given our case law, we also conclude that the prosecutor’s questions constituted plain error.  W we also conclude that the state has met its burden, as set out in Ramey, of showing that the misconduct did not affect Davis’s substantial rights.  In this case, the evidence against Davis was substantial and compelling and included his admission that he had shot Allan and Morocho during an attempt to rob them.  A self-defense claim was not available to an armed robber who encounters resistance from his victims.

Third, the Court held that it may have been misconduct for the prosecutor to belittle Davis’ self-defense claim on the stand, but it did not constitute reversible misconduct.

                    Page (Russell Anderson, Paul Anderson, Hanson, Meyer, Barry Anderson, and Gildea

DATE OF DECISION:  July 19, 2007

RECORD NUMBER:  2007-099

FULL OPINION: 

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] 

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2007-M-050                                    Thomas Daniel Rhodes, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

A jury found Rhodes guilty of premeditated first-degree murder.   The district court judge sentenced Rhodes to life in prison/  The Court upheld the conviction on direct appeal in 2001.  The remanded the first post-conviction petition for an evidentiary hearing, then again upheld the convictions in 2003.

The Court here upheld the convictions a third time .  . In this petition, Rhodes argued that he was denied due process of law because his conviction was based on  supposition and conjecture as newly discovered evidence proves,  and he was denied effective assistance of counsel.  The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the new evidence did not meet the four-part test for such supposed evidence, and counsel did not fail to be effective.

                    Gildea (Russell Anderson, Page, Paul Anderson, Hanson, Meyer, and Barry Anderson)

DATE OF DECISION:  July 19, 2007

RECORD NUMBER:  2007-097

FULL OPINION: 

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] 

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2007-M-049                                    Louis Buggs, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Appellant was convicted of premeditated first degree murder after shooting the mother of his child eight times at her work.  The Court affirmed his conviction on his direct appeal in1998.  Here, the Court held the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing.

“We conclude that, at the time of his direct appeal, Buggs either knew or should have known of any claims available to him based on the procedures used to select the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him.  Information relating to those procedures was at the time, and continues to be, publicly available.  Indeed, those procedures have been the subject of decisions by this court.  Information relating to the racial composition of the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him was also publicly available at the time of his direct appeal.  Therefore, Buggs’ claims relating to the racial composition of his grand jury and petit jury were either known or should have been known to him at the time of his direct appeal.”

DATE OF DECISION:  June 28, 2007

RECORD NUMBER:  2007-085

FULL OPINION: 

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] 

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2007-M-048                Victor Fields, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Victor Fields was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder for his role in the shooting death of LeTerrance Paige and the wounding of Keinon Love.  The Court affirmed his conviction in2004.

Here, the Court held that his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was barred because he could have raised that claim on direct appeal.  The Court also held that his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed because there was no evidence that failure to make the arguments that [Fields] cites would have resulted in a different decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court.

                    Page (Russell Anderson, Paul Anderson, Hanson, Meyer, Barry Anderson, and Gildea)

DATE OF DECISION:  June 21, 2007

RECORD NUMBER:  2007-081

FULL OPINION: 

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] 

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2007-M-047                State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Billy Bailey, Appellant.

MAJORITY:   Appellant Billy Bailey was convicted of first-degree murder while committing criminal sexual conduct in connection with the May 1984 death of a 69-year-old woman.  The Court upheld the conviction against all four claims on appeal.

First, the Court held that the district court properly denied the defendant’s Batson challenge where the defendant did not show that the state’s race-neutral explanations for striking a minority juror were pretextual or that the strike was motivated by race.  Second, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defense counsel opened the door to testimony that four DNA loci that measured less than 150 relative fluorescent units could not exclude the defendant as the source of the DNA.

Third, the Court held that the district court did not err in excluding as irrelevant expert testimony that the state should have performed a validation study before using a Bunsen burner to remove a cover slip from a DNA sample.  Fourth, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Spreigl evidence that the defendant pled guilty to three burglaries, where the law of the case was that the evidence was admissible.

DISSENT:  Justices Page and Paul Anderson opined:  “I respectfully dissent.  I do so because the court’s Batson analysis will again, as it has in the past,[5] have a negative impact on the ability of people of color to vindicate their Fourteenth Amendment right to participate in jury service.  See State v. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 2003).  In this case, the court allows a state to strike a prospective juror who, having personally been the victim of discrimination based on her appearance, expressed anger at the idea that her fellow prospective jurors would form negative opinions about the defendant based solely on his appearance a fact extraneous and irrelevant to the issues to be decided in the case.”

                    Barry Anderson (Russell Anderson, Page, Paul Anderson, Hanson, Meyer, and Gildea)

                    DISSENT:  Page and Paul Anderson

DATE OF DECISION:  June 7, 2007

RECORD NUMBER:  2007-071

FULL OPINION: 

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] 

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2007-M-046                State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jairam Ganpat, Appellant.

Appellant Jairam Ganpat was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree intentional murder, and second-degree unintentional felony murder of his girlfriend, Moonku Persaud.  On this direct appeal, the Court upheld the conviction.

First, the Court held that the district court gave proper weight to the evidence and correctly determined that the defendant was competent to stand trial.  Second, the Court held that the district court’s conclusion that the defendant did not unambiguously or unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent was not clearly erroneous where the defendant declined to answer questions but explained that he did so because he was “not feeling well right now.”

Third, the Court held that the district court’s conclusion that the defendant waived his right to remain silent by responding to questions during his fourth interview with police was not clearly erroneous where he had been given Miranda warnings during two prior interviews, the same detective was involved in all interviews, the defendant was given a third Miranda warning in the middle of the fourth interview, and the detective assured the defendant that he could say “I don’t remember” to any question he did not want to answer.

Fourth, the Court held that defendant’s statements made during his fourth interview with police were voluntarily made where he had been given Miranda warnings in two prior interviews, there was no evidence of coercion, and defendant repeatedly denied that he had committed the murder.

                    Hanson (Russell Anderson, Page, Paul Anderson, Meyer, Barry Anderson, and Gildea)

DATE OF DECISION:  June 7, 2007

RECORD NUMBER:  2007-070

FULL OPINION: 

DESCRIPTION:  [MURDER] 

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