Shooting a Minneapolis woman whose Fruend had Ridiculed a Drug Dealer's Fancy Tire Rims
2007-M-040 Michael C. Francis, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent
:
THE CRIME: When Marvin Pate ridiculed the specialized tire rims on drug-dealer Michael Francis’ truck, Francis took offense. Later, Pate was assisting his girlfriend Pamela to exit his car in Minneapolis when he noticed the large blue truck pulling up.
Francis was convicted of shooting Pate in the abdomen, back and hip, and killing Richardson with a single shot to the head. He was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence for the murder and a 15-year sentence for the attempted murder.
THIS DIRECT APPEAL: Francis represented himself in this direct appeal.
He contended that:1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction; 2) that he was deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct, evidentiary errors, incomplete jury instructions, lack of effective assistance of counsel, and other improprieties at trial; and 3) that he should have been granted a post-trial hearing of his claims against the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial’s procedures.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE: The Supreme Court held the evidence was extensive and sufficient.
In the ambulance on the way to the hospital, Pate identified the shooter as “Mike” and later gave police at both the full name and physical description of ”Mike Francis.” An observation camera caught Francis’ truck turning into the intersection of the shooting at the time of the shooting. Francis’ cell phone was triangulated to be at the scene of the shooting ate time of the shooting. Francis testified that he did not know where he was at the time of the shooting.
DIRECT EXAMINATION: When the prosecutor asked the lead detective to describe how he had investigated the case, the detective said he had consulted aging-unit officer and retrieved Francis’ photo from a crime-unit data base. The Supreme Court said that the prosecutor had advised the detective to avoid such prejudicial testimony, and that the trial court had properly issued mandatory jury instructions to ignore such testimony.
CROSS EXAMINATION: When Francis offered a character witness to say that he was non-violent, the prosecutor then asked the witness about specific events in Francis’ past. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge had properly limited these questions to the witness’ direct testimony, the trial court properly limited the prosecutor to inquiries about specific acts that directly contradicted the witness’ original testimony, and that the trial court gave the jury the required instructions on how to construe the cross-examination.
CLOSING ARGUMENT: In her closing argument, the prosecutor made references to Francis as a drug dealer. The Supreme Court noted that Francis had described himself as a drug dealer in his own testimony to the jury.
ADMISSION OF CELL RECORDS AND TRAFFIC VIDEO: The Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly approved both the foundation and the relevance of the cell records and traffic video to show the presence of Francis and his vehicle at the scene and time of the shooting. It was for the jury to determine both the weight and the credibility of this evidence.
ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY OF AN ILL WITNESS: Francis challenged the admission of testimony of a witness who had been diagnosed with “bipolar schizophrenia. The Supreme Court ruled that here, the witness’s illness and response to medication were thoroughly explored by defense counsel on cross-examination and the record reflects that the witness was plainly competent to testify.
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE PERPETRATOR: Francis asserted error in the exclusion of his proffered evidence of an alternative perpetrator. Alternative perpetrator evidence is inadmissible absent some evidence having an inherent tendency to connect the alternative perpetrator with the crime. Francis put Ragland’s former boyfriend forward as an alternative perpetrator, but Francis did not have sufficient evidence to connect the former boyfriend to the crime so as to satisfy the alternative perpetrator standard.
FRANCIS’ FIREARMS CONVICTION AND PATE’S PRIOR ARREST: Francis asserted error in the district court’s rulings in allowing the prosecutor to impeach him with a conviction for misdemeanor possession of a firearm and in limiting his inquiry into Pate’s pretrial confinement. “We need not determine whether these rulings were an abuse of discretion where, even cumulatively in light of the entire record, error, if any, was not prejudicial.”
LESSER OFFENSE: Francis asserted error in the denial of his request for jury instructions on lesser-included second-degree unintentional murder offenses. An instruction on a lesser-included offense should be given “‘if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.’”
“Here, where the jury was given a lesser-included-offense instruction as to second- degree intentional, unpremeditated murder and attempt of the same, yet found Francis guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and attempt of the same, we conclude that Francis was not prejudiced by the court’s refusal to give instructions as to unintentional murder.”
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: Francis claimed he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel, asserting that counsel failed to investigate his case, failed to call alibi witnesses, failed to prepare his character witness, failed to question him carefully on direct examination and otherwise failed to defend him adequately at trial. The Supreme Court held that “as the post-conviction court noted, Francis’s allegations of inadequate legal representation are refuted by the record and otherwise fail to show that had trial counsel presented additional evidence and otherwise addressed Francis’s concerns, the result would have been different. “
NINE OTHER TRIAL CHALLENGES: Francis challenged the seizure of his Tahoe, the jury selection process, the admission of the photographic lineup and the admission of “blurry” photographs; he asserted discovery violations, juror misconduct, and the denial of a speedy trial; and he also stated that his convictions rest on invalid laws and that consecutive sentencing is in error. The Supreme Court held that “after a careful examination of these claims, we find them meritless.”
DENIAL OF A POST-TRIAL HEARING: Francis contended that the post-conviction court abused its discretion in denying him an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing is not required unless facts are alleged that, if proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief.
“A petitioner’s allegations must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support. Francis contends that an evidentiary hearing was needed to evaluate the claims he raised in his post-conviction petition and now on appeal to this court. We agree with the post-conviction court’s denial of a hearing in that the facts as alleged would not entitle Francis to relief.”
CONCLUSION: “In conclusion, we are satisfied from our meticulous review of the trial record that Francis was properly convicted and received a fair trial. We further conclude that the denial of post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion.”
Russell Anderson (Page, Paul Anderson, Hanson, Meyer, Barry Anderson, and Gildea)
DATE OF DECISION: April 5, 2007
RECORD NUMBER: 2007-050
DESCRIPTION: [MURDER] [DRUGS]
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